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Across the United States, citizens are directly impacted each day by the policies and programs 
adopted by local governments. Municipal governance in the United States is conducted by 
elected and administrative officials, who conduct themselves similarly to officials at other levels 
of government. Developing and utilizing an adapted theoretical framework based on the theories 
of bureaucratic politics, social construction, and policy feedback, this project asks: how do 
municipal bureaucrats and local politicians respond to crises of public health and safety in their 
jurisdictions, and to what extent do those responses mitigate or exacerbate the crises in question?  
Using data collected from observations, interviews, and publicly available city council meeting 
minutes, this study delineates the steps taken to adapt an established theoretical framework 
through rigorous qualitative inquiry including content analysis, mini-ethnography, and stories for 
research. Further, formal propositions concerning the anticipated priorities, values, and actions of 
local bureaucrats and politicians are proposed, and specific conclusions are presented that 
demonstrate the validity of those propositions. Finally, a larger research agenda is proposed, 
focused on refining and exploring the adapted theoretical framework through case studies, as 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
Every day across America, citizens feel the impact of public policy created and 
implemented by local governments. When it comes to issues like community safety, public 
health, and affordable housing, the quality of life of the American citizen is determined in 
significant and meaningful ways by local governments and the policies they create. The process 
by which public policy at the local level is created and the resultant outcomes of those policies 
are part of the larger ecosystem of governance in the United States. This process engages elected 
and administrative officials in political struggles in which bargaining, horse-trading, and 
compromise are common, and just as policy at the federal level is constantly reinterpreted and 
revised by elected and administrative officials, so too are the local laws and regulations that most 
directly impact the citizen.  
However, all too often, we see examples of how the federal government fails to respond 
adequately to various crises, both human and natural (Hartman & Squires, 2006; Roberts, 2006). 
Similar processes replay themselves in cities across the country, where local government has 
been slow or ineffective in preventing or reacting to critical issues, particularly those that fall 
under the broad heading of public health and safety. In the past decade, there have been 
numerous publicized instances where municipalities in the United States have been faced with 
what are often characterized in the media as sudden and unexpected health and safety crises. 
However, the characterization of these crises as sudden or unexpected lacks empirical evidence, 
and therefore the claim must be examined from critical perspective. This project seeks to do so 
through detailed analyses of two high-profile cases where local governments have engaged with 
health and safety crises. In Flint, Michigan (MI), a lack of clean drinking water has forced 
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citizens to rely on bottled water for everything from cooking to showering (Davis, Kolb, 
Reynolds, Rothstein, & Sikkema, 2016, March 21; Graham, 2016a, 2016b). In Manchester, New 
Hampshire (NH), opioids have ravaged the city, with citizens of New Hampshire overdosing on 
fentanyl at the highest rates in the country (Leins, 2017). Manchester accounts for 25% of 
opioid-related deaths, but has only 8% of the population in the state (Soucy & O'Higgins, 2016). 
Although these two crises are substantively different, they are not entirely unique when it comes 
to the ways in which both local governments have addressed them through the policy process. In 
fact, the commonalities in the policy-making process that preceded them and proceeded from 
them may prove instrumental in understanding how other local governments engage in policy 
making around acute issues of health and safety. To develop an understanding of this process, I 
ask: how do municipal bureaucrats and local politicians respond to crises in their jurisdictions, 
and to what extent do those responses mitigate or exacerbate the crises in question?  
To answer this, I conducted two case studies. The two cases selected for inclusion and 
analysis here were chosen based on several characteristics. First, they both received extensive 
media attention at the national level, which allows for an assessment of the impact of policy 
feedback from mass publics. Second, they were accessible and responsive in terms of public 
records, meetings, and willingness to engage in critical research. Third, both Flint and 
Manchester have suffered economic downturns, political scandals, and/or cultural shifts in the 
recent past. As this study seeks to connect the crises in each city with the underlying issues that 
may already exist, a city that is otherwise in “good shape” is not a good candidate for a case 
study. However, as the conclusions of this project suggest, there is much work to be done on the 
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broader topic of municipal public health and safety crisis, and these cases are far from the only 
cities that have suffered from similar problems. 
The cases were analyzed over the same period, 2013-2017, marking the beginning of 
each crisis, the peak of each, and continuing to the present, as neither crisis has been fully 
resolved. Three sources of data and three methodologies were utilized to conduct the case 
studies: short ethnographic observations, or mini-ethnographies; city council meeting minutes 
for the years 2013-2017, coded using a modified membership categorization analysis; and 
interviews, conducted and coded using a modified stories for research methodology. Out of this 
analysis, specific conclusions and next steps for research are presented, as well as potential 
shortcomings of this particular study and how future work may fill those gaps. 
Beyond looking for commonalities that could help explain the policy process and 
outcomes that led to and led from these crises, this work will also serve as an attempt to tell the 
stories of the people whose lives have been impacted by these crises and related policies. This 
includes administrators and politicians who are formally involved in the policy process, 
representatives of businesses and non-profits, interest groups, and activists who either formally 
or informally engage in that process, as well as citizens who have felt the impact of these crises 
and associated policies first-hand. These personal accounts of the policy process and its impacts 
provide context to the theoretical and practical understandings presented herein.  
Furthermore, a revised framework of bureaucratic politics is developed  to answer 
fundamental questions about public administration and the relationship between democracy and 
bureaucracy, as discussed by Simon, Drucker, and Waldo (1952). By recognizing the critical role 
that bureaucrats play in the policy process, this work attempts to support Waldo’s view that 
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administration is not entirely separate from bureaucracy, that efficiency is not the only value or 
tenet favored by bureaucrats, and that the ideals of scientific management are not a good guide to 
responsible bureaucratic action (Waldo, 1952). 
Finally, within the discipline of public administration, there have been frequent calls to 
improve upon the theoretical foundations of the field (Dobel, 2001; Kirlin, 2001; Rosenbloom, 
1983), and this is the primary goal of this study. In developing the aforementioned framework, 
this project seeks to challenge the notion that public administration is atheoretical, while 
simultaneously using methodologies, theories, and sources that are interdisciplinary in nature to 
build a wider theoretical base for the discipline. Expanding the theoretical underpinnings of the 
study of local government is a constant and necessary challenge for scholars of the field, and 
developing a theory based on existing theoretical concepts, while incorporating the reality of 
contemporary events and utilizing innovative sources and methods will help to shepherd public 
administration and the study of government into the next part of this century.  
Bureaucratic Politics and Local Government 
Understanding the specific mechanics of decision-making at the local level as it relates to 
policy is an understudied area of public administration, but a critical process that must be 
understood if scholars are to better delineate important concepts such as federalism, policy 
formulation, and the power of administrators to shape policy. While there are several theoretical 
approaches to this complex process, it is the traditional theoretical framework of bureaucratic 
politics that is best suited to be revised to apply to local policy formulation. Developed in part 
out of the original decision-making theories of public administration, bureaucratic politics 
encompasses how decisions are made in the context of bureaucratic structure (Merton, 1940), 
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order-giving and hierarchy (Barnard, 1938; Follett, 1926), and the human factors that influence 
each player in the game (Maslow, 1943). This framework has traditionally been applied to 
federal-level actors, but it has been adapted in this work to fit the particularities of municipal 
government.  
Local governments are substantively different in many ways from federal or state 
governments, as clearly demonstrated through the numerous studies of municipal elections, 
politics, and bureaucracies that have thus far assisted in our understanding of local democracy. 
These differences extend to most elements of government, including the policy process. 
Executives, both mayors and city managers, have significantly more power over the policy 
process than the President or Speaker of the House, while legislatures and courts hold 
substantially less power (Fox, 1974). The financial structure of local governments is varied as 
well, and the budgeting process is driven by professional standards and the attempts of 
bureaucratic agencies to keep their municipalities stable, which does not always lead to positive 
outcomes for the majority of citizens (Levy, Meltsner, & Wildavsky, 1974). Furthermore, the 
political structures of cities are varied and idiosyncratic, and policy solutions that are successful 
for a particular city may not always be successful in others (Stone, Whelan, & Murin, 1986). 
Finally, the relatively small size, limited scope, and local bias of a particular city will always 
remain present, shaping the nature of policy-making in that particular municipality (Oliver, Ha, 
& Callen, 2012).  
However, the nature of these differences varies depending upon on the municipality 
itself, based on the unique characteristics that exist within a given town or city. This distinction 
makes the process of developing political and administrative theoretical frameworks difficult, but 
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all the more necessary if scholars are to understand how local governance operates in practice. 
Local democracies make important decisions that impact that lives of citizens in meaningful 
ways. If public policy is defined as the decisions made by government that lead to both actions 
and nonactions (Weible, 2014), then consequential decisions made at the local level are in fact 
public policy, even if they are not laws or regulations codified in the U.S. Code or at the state 
level. Therefore, it is critical to develop tools that will help scholars to understand how such local 
policy is formed. A revised theory of bureaucratic politics is an important step towards 
understanding how decisions are made within local governments.  
There are lessons to learn about local governance from the study of national governance. 
Such lessons are primarily useful in understanding the significant differences that exist between 
local and federal governments, as well between the thousands of local governments that exist in 
the United States. In particular, it is noted that local governments vary widely in three areas: size, 
a reference to population; scope, which considers the duties and activities of that particular 
government; and bias, which can impact how costs and benefits are delivered to constituents 
based upon affluence, racial composition, and other factors. In a study of local elections, these 
three variables are found to be particularly useful in understanding the differences in electoral 
politics among local governments, and may be helpful to consider when reflecting on similar 
differences that may exist in the bureaucratic decision-making processes among governments at 
the local level (Oliver et al., 2012).  
Popular existing theories of local policy and politics include classical pluralism (R. A. 
Dahl, 1961), urban regimes (Stone, 1989), and the economic imperative of competition between 
cities (Peterson, 1981). Each of these theories addresses the politics of municipal governance, 
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and by doing so touches on the policy process in those governments. However, these theories 
address the governance of cities during the regular, everyday process of governing a 
municipality. While elements of these theories, in particular the focus on economic concerns as 
explored by Peterson (1981), are relevant to how municipal government behaves, there remain 
unanswered questions as to what the actual decision-making process looks like during a crisis. 
To understand governance during a crisis, a revised theory of bureaucratic politics, whose 
explanatory power is explored in the cases set forward here, is an important step towards 
understanding how decisions are made within local governments during periods of acute crisis. 
The first step is to delineate the differences in the local process from the federal process, 
thereby creating a revised framework of bureaucratic politics that applies specifically to local 
government. To do so, it is necessary to conceptualize that framework as an extension of existing 
literatures that help us understand policy formulation at the local level, and the relevance that 
local administrators have to that process: bureaucratic power (Carpenter, 2001; Carpenter & 
Krause, 2012), policy feedback (Mettler, 2002; Mettler & SoRelle, 2014; Moynihan & Soss, 
2014; Soss & Schram, 2007), and the social construction of populations (Schneider, Ingram, & 
de Leon, 2014; Soss & Weaver, 2017).  
Formal Propositions 
It should be made clear from the outset that this project is neither intended to be easily 
replicable, nor to present definitive and falsifiable causal conclusions. Broadly, this project 
proposes that municipal bureaucrats and politicians across multiple cities act similarly during the 
policy creation process and attempt to push their chosen policy in the established manner of 
bureaucratic politics. Their chosen goals may vary, but they will focus on cost-savings and 
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efficiency over health and safety. This research is an exploratory undertaking that will attempt to 
identify and delineate important and understudied elements of the local policy-making process. 
In doing so, I hope to understand how municipal bureaucrats and local politicians engaged in 
those processes respond to crises in their jurisdictions, and thereby establish a revised theory of 
bureaucratic politics which may be used to conduct causal and replicable studies in the future. 
This thesis is operationalized into specific propositions below: 
 
Figure 1. Formal propositions. 
With definitions and formal propositions laid out, this manuscript proceeds as follows: 
Chapter II builds upon these definitions, and reviews the literature concerning bureaucratic 
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politics, bureaucratic power, policy feedback, and social construction. In doing so, key elements 
of these literatures are defined and explored to position this research within the appropriate 
context. Chapter III sets forth and defends a revised framework of local bureaucratic politics to 
create a new model for assessing the policy formulation process in local government. Chapters 
IV and V consider the cases of water quality in Flint, MI, and opioid addiction in Manchester, 
NH, respectively. Chapter VI reviews the findings from each of these cases and offers cross-case 
analysis, while Chapter VII discusses the implications for both practitioners and academics, 
provides an overview of the limits of this study, and makes recommendations for future work in 





Chapter II: Theoretical Foundations  
Bureaucratic Politics  
To apply to local policy formulation, the original theory of bureaucratic politics must be 
critically reviewed to explain how a revised framework will address the inconsistencies between 
how federal government decision-making processes operate, and how local governments 
formulate policy. Additionally, as is shown later in this chapter, it is the structural forces 
stemming from the relative power of individual actors, the impact of policy feedback, and the 
social construction of populations that help to shape and define local policy formulation, and 
these components must also be included in this revised theory. 
While the traditional model of bureaucratic politics places administrative and elected 
actors around a table, insulated from the outside world while bargaining and cooperating among 
themselves, this adapted framework places the bargaining table in the public eye and in an 
accessible setting–the city council chambers. In addition to the smoky backrooms of the State 
Department, local bureaucratic politics takes place in the public chambers of city councils and 
other local legislative bodies across the United States. This means that any theory of local 
bureaucratic politics must take into account this change in setting, and the potential factors, 
influences, and consequences that come along with it. Through the analysis conducted here, an 
adapted and revised theory will be presented as an alternative that takes into account the 
dynamism and distinctiveness of American local government. 
As each of these elements is discussed in turn, the focus of the research is on developing 
grounded theory out of these literatures that can be operationalized, tested, and formalized within 
the context of two specific cases of crises in local government. In this literature review, as in the 
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analysis of data that follows, the emphasis is on an interpretative approach that allows for the 
data itself, in this case the existing literature, to illuminate for the researcher the specific 
elements of theory to be brought to bear on the problem at hand (Diaz Andrade, 2009). A 
lengthier discussion of this process will be described in Chapter III, as part of the broader 
consideration of the methodological approaches used throughout this study.  
The existing literature on bureaucratic politics reveals eight crucial questions that must be 
answered before creating a model of bureaucratic politics for local government. These questions 
consider the players or actors at the decision-making table; their power, parochial interests and 
values; the structural, environmental and organizational factors that affect the process; how both 
individuals and organizations bargain and cooperate to reach decisions; and how varying 
perspectives and perceptions of accountability impact the decision-making process. Addressing 
these questions by applying foundational theory along with seminal works in the field provides a 
rich base from which to explore the implications of bureaucratic politics on local government, 
particularly local policy formulation. 
Who “sits at the table” to make decisions? In the traditional theory of bureaucratic 
politics, the “decision-making table” consists of a chief executive and their staff, professional 
administrators representing both upper and middle levels of an organization, and elected political 
officials (Allison & Zelikow, 1971; Bryner, 1987; Cleveland, 1956; Meier, 1987; Rourke, 1969). 
These individuals come into the process with networks, roles, and structures already in place that 
constrain their ability to make certain decisions, but which are adaptable and flexible depending 
upon the other individuals involved in the process, the organizational environment, and the 
formal and informal hierarchies present within the group (Appleby, 1949; Halperin & Clapp, 
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1974; Long, 1949; Ripley & Franklin, 1984). The process continues after the official “decision” 
has been reached, with bureaucrats in particular controlling practice, implementation, and 
enforcement, supported by an informational asymmetry that benefits those on the front lines of 
policy (Bryner, 1987; Goodsell, 2003). This structure has been shown to accurately describe the 
federal decision-making process, and there is evidence to suggest that a similar dynamic may 
exist at the local level. 
As local government in the United States has evolved, it has been shaped by multiple 
forces, including norms, legal precedent, political machines, and attempts at federal government 
control (Gottdiener, 1987). Despite the changing nature of local government, similar actors can 
be expected to participate in local policy formulation as at the federal or state level. City 
executives, managers, and career bureaucrats are involved in the policy formulation process, and 
to a lesser extent municipal legislatures may weigh in. Bureaucrats involved in rule-making at 
the local level may prefer a strong principal or chief executive guiding the process, so long as the 
actions of that executive help to “get things done” (Gains, John, & Stoker, 2008). Finally, at the 
local level in particular, citizens may have substantial influence depending on the issue, and may 
be involved both formally through organized committees and informally through pressure groups 
that seek to influence the policy formulation process. These groups may include neighborhood 
organizations motivated by positive policy feedback that encourages them to become more 
engaged (Levy et al., 1974; Sharp, 2012).  
There is another player at the table when it comes to local decision-making: corporate 
interests. Unlike the strict conflict-of-interest laws, rules, and norms that purport to help shape 
decision-making at the federal level, at the local level there is ample opportunity for corporations 
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and businesses to represent themselves in the policy process. This is most discernable in the tax 
abatement and development subsidies frequently provided by cities to businesses, often without 
discretion or meaningful intent. Evidence suggests that municipal economic policy is influenced 
by these interests, the very interests such policies might have been intended to constrain (Sharp, 
2012).  
Finally, the unique character of the elected officials within local government should be 
considered. Often driven by a sense of duty and civic commitment, elected officials in local 
government are dedicated to serving their constituents as problem-solvers, addressing one issue 
at a time. This focus contrasts with the filter of electoral politics that may cloud the decisions of 
federal or state elected officials. This problem-solving focus is partially due to the high rate of 
local incumbents retaining their positions, but in no small part also due to the managerial nature 
of local democracies. Elected officials are more likely to focus on parochial and temporary 
issues, attempting to “solve problems” for their constituents, not on larger social or economic 
issues within their communities (Oliver et al., 2012).  
How do structural, environmental, and organizational factors influence the 
decision-making process? The theory of bureaucratic politics considers a number of critical 
factors, including internal factors such as group membership, the physical environment of a 
decision-making process, organizational culture, and bureaucratic rules and structures (Appleby, 
1949; Barnard, 1938; Reagan, 1987; Seidman, 1970; Stillman, 2004). Outside forces including 
socioeconomic, political, and administrative factors will impact decision-making as well 
(Cleveland, 1956; Meier, 1987). Within a given decision-making group, structures and pressures 
from the organizations represented by the individuals at the table may be brought in, including 
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formal mandates, sub-governments, and particular interests and values (Allison & Zelikow, 
1971; Brower & Abolafia, 1997; Goodsell, 2003; Ripley & Franklin, 1984). Additionally, these 
individuals bring with them the routines and decision-making processes, issue networks, and 
institutional norms of their respective organizations (Hammond, 1986; Heclo, 1978; Selznick, 
2011).  
The structures that influence the local decision-making process are similar to those 
defined in the literature on bureaucratic politics, with some exceptions. First, there is wide 
variation in the goals, behavior, and professionalism of bureaucratic agencies at the local level. 
This leads to an analogous gap between the power and complexity of some local agencies 
compared to others (Fox, 1974). There are numerous variations on governmental structure in 
local government, including weak/strong mayoral systems, commissions, council-manager 
systems, and others (Stone et al., 1986). These factors lead to a unique policy-making 
environment at the local level, which is shaped by both socioeconomic and structural factors 
(Levy et al., 1974). Furthermore, local governments are subject to the idiosyncratic 
circumstances of their particular jurisdictions as opposed to the larger structural and systematic 
influences of the federal government. This creates an environment in which decisions are made 
with an eye towards problem-solving, as opposed to far-reaching structural implications (Oliver 
et al., 2012).  
Most local government decisions involve the provision and distribution of services, a 
distributive policy measure, and not redistributive or social policies. When redistributive or 
social policies are enacted at the local level, it is often due to state or federal mandate, which 
circumvents the local decision-making process. This leads to a decision-making process in which 
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bureaucrats are intimately involved in both the agenda-setting and implementation phases of 
policymaking. Additionally, since the other policies enacted by local governments are frequently 
created to promote business development, local business leaders and corporations are heavily 
involved in the process of creating favorable policy including tax abatements and subsidies 
(Sharp, 2012). Therefore, when local governments make policy decisions, the decision-makers 
are primarily influenced by structural and environmental factors that are generated by the 
individuals chosen to represent the administrative arm of government, and in some cases by the 
business community. 
How are the parochial and particular values and interests of these actors 
represented? Administrators and elected officials, or their chosen representatives at the 
bargaining table, will approach any decision-making process with varied opinions, choices, and 
personal interests. These may include remote, immediate or personally opportunistic purposes, as 
well as the values and interests of their organizations (Appleby, 1949; Barnard, 1938; Halperin & 
Clapp, 1974). While they may be influenced by the values and interests of their judicial or 
legislative peers, elected and administrative officials are unlikely to represent the choices of 
those branches of government when bargaining at the table (Meier, 1987; Stillman, 2004). 
Furthermore, the interests of the public, organizational leadership, and individual rank-and-file 
members of the organization should be represented, but in practice this does not always occur. 
Those interests may be mitigated by the personal priorities of the individuals at the table, 
whether or not they are in line with the views of the organization the individual represents 
(Allison & Zelikow, 1971; Brower & Abolafia, 1997; Finer, 1941; O'Leary, 2019) 
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The values and interests of actors at the local level are often contradictory, and part of a 
larger set of values based on their organizational or personal beliefs. Frequently, there is a focus 
on efficiency, particularly with regard to budgetary concerns, among local policy-makers 
(Boyne, 1998). Elected officials, involved in a decision-making process that results in a 
distributive policy, may engage in “area rewards,” distributing resources based on voting patterns 
in certain neighborhoods and impacted by the political orientation of the community represented 
(Cingranelli, 1981; Stensöta, 2011). Nalbandian (1990, 1999) writes that in addition to 
efficiency, the local government professional considers representation, individual rights, and 
social equity. These values, according to Nalbandian, help to establish the professionalism of the 
local bureaucrat, which should serve that individual well when attempting to express their power 
within the policy formulation process.  
While elected officials often give lip service to the concerns of community organizations, 
the interests of those organizations are not always represented when decisions are being made. 
Whether or not the concerns of mass publics are heard in local government decision-making is 
partially based on the socioeconomic status and demographic characteristics of the group in 
question. It is also a function of the size and structure of the city, as evidence suggests that 
smaller cities will be more likely to consider such concerns (Sharp, 2012). The cohesiveness of 
neighborhood or activist groups can impact the level of influence that public opinion will have 
on a decision, as more cohesive coalitions will have a better chance of inducing the elected 
officials who represent them to adequately represent their interests (Stone, 1989). 
How does the relative power of different officials influence decisions? Power in 
decision-making processes is driven foremost by the possession and distribution of information. 
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Roles, authority, and hierarchical control help to determine who possesses what information, and 
thereby what power they have (Appleby, 1949; Barnard, 1938; Long, 1949). The organizational 
home of the actors at the table is also critical to understanding their power, as the control they 
exert over their own organization is likely to be predictive of the type of control they may exert 
within a given decision-making scenario. Furthermore, administrative officials are more likely to 
possess useful information than elected officials, given the nature of their positions and the value 
placed upon information within their organizations (Rourke, 1969; Seidman, 1970). 
Power for local government bureaucrats depends on the technical complexity, structural 
autonomy, complexity, and political skill of the individual and their agency. The formal power of 
chief executives and city managers, while potentially strong, depends upon where they sit in the 
structure of a particular local government. Legislatures and courts are nearly always near the 
bottom of the local power hierarchy (Fox, 1974). Community organizations and businesses hold 
significant power in any local decision-making process (Stone et al., 1986), as do employee 
unions (Fox, 1974). Municipal fragmentation in particular allows for a decentralized structure of 
power in local government, adding to the tension around power distribution at the local level 
(Gottdiener, 1987). 
The power granted to neighborhood organizations and communities varies and, like the 
representation of their values and interests, is a function of socioeconomic status, demographics, 
and the cohesiveness of their coalition (Sharp, 2012; Stone, 1989). The managerially democratic 
nature of small municipalities gives more power to those actors who “get things done,” and 
rewards individuals who act with a focus towards solving particular problems with greater power 
(Oliver et al., 2012). In local democracies, power is still dependent on similar factors as at the 
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federal level, but the potency of information and expertise as the source of this power is 
magnified.  
How do bureaucrats and politicians cooperate or bargain to reach decisions? 
Bargaining occurs once the actors at the table have been chosen, the avenue of implementation is 
clear, and those actors who may have an option to either join or sit out a decision have made 
their choice (Halperin & Clapp, 1974; Meier, 1987). At the bargaining stage, the executive is 
able to set the agenda, facilitate cooperation through inducements and incentives, and force 
multiple actors to work together towards particular goals (Barnard, 1938; Cleveland, 1956; 
Heclo, 1978). Administrators will act according to the pressures and incentives from their own 
organizations, as well as according to the personal and professional relationships they have with 
others at the table. By controlling information and mobilizing support, administrators may serve 
as independent power brokers (Halperin & Clapp, 1974; Long, 1949; Rourke, 1969). This 
process, begun even before actors reach the table through informal and formal hierarchies and 
structures, facilitates bargaining and cooperation towards a decision, based in technical data as 
well as values and created within the context of the bureaucratic rules that govern the process 
(Meier, Stewart Jr, & England, 1991; Peters, 2002; Wildavsky, 1964). 
Local government policy-makers bargain not only among each other, but also with 
individuals and organizations at other levels of government, particularly when it comes to 
budgetary issues (Cingranelli, 1981; Gottdiener, 1987). Bargaining occurs between executives, 
elected officials, and bureaucrats in a similar manner to other levels of government (Fox, 1974). 
This bargaining is often based on information and data, particularly when bureaucrats are 
involved (Levy et al., 1974). There is often tension between state and local governments, and so 
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the bargaining that takes place at the decision-making table, as well as post-hoc during the 
implementation phase, may enmesh actors at both levels in a principal-agent relationship 
(Rasmussen, 2000). 
The managerial nature and focused problem-solving of local officials leads to a 
bargaining process that considers efficiency and budgetary concerns above all, and without 
foreign policy or massive political ramifications that force the veto of certain options, decisions 
are made almost entirely on the problem at hand. Of course, electoral considerations for some 
officials are still meaningful, but without the pressure of a massive party apparatus, they are less 
likely to impact decisions in a significant way (Oliver et al., 2012; Sharp, 2012). Even with 
engagement from neighborhood groups, the influential role of the business community, and 
pressure from other coalitions outside of government, local decision-makers have an ability to 
“get things done” that those at the federal level potentially do not (Stone, 1989). 
How do formal and informal networks, organizations, and relationships impact 
decisions? Decision-making is not influenced merely by the hierarchical order of the actors 
making the decision, but takes place within a complex network of formal and informal 
relationships, where power is based on information control (Appleby, 1949; Halperin & Clapp, 
1974). The formal and informal structures of the originating organizations of the actors plays a 
role in how the decision-making process is structured, and informal networks may be created 
between the actors at the table to facilitate cooperation and bargaining (Rourke, 1969; Seidman, 
1970). These networks can be based on the transfer of information, the promotion of 
organizational priorities, or a shared focus on a particular issue (Brower & Abolafia, 1997; 
Hammond, 1986; Heclo, 1978).  
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Similar structures exist in the context of local decision-making, including formal 
organizations such as administrative agencies and political parties, along with informal networks 
that include interest groups, personal relationships, and hierarchies (Debus, Knill, & Tosun, 
2013; Fox, 1974). However, there is a unique power in the direct link between a local 
government and the community it serves, which allows public opinion to have a larger impact on 
how decisions are made, particularly when it comes to matters of resource and service 
distribution policy. While community involvement in local government has declined over time, 
there is still no doubt that the influence of citizens on government is felt most directly at the local 
level (Gottdiener, 1987).  
Since local government is not defined in the Constitution and is inherently dependent on 
state government for certain resources and power (Gottdiener, 1987), the relationship between 
local and state governments may be particularly fraught and complicated. While local 
governments often have jurisdiction over the distribution of resources and funding levels (Levy 
et al., 1974), state officials may have the ability to regulate local agencies, creating a principal-
agent conflict between the two levels of government (Rasmussen, 2000). The structures of 
municipal governments vary dramatically, and the organizations and relationships within a given 
local government and with their respective state government are likely to vary depending on 
numerous factors unique to individual municipalities  (Stone et al., 1986). 
The impact of the idiosyncratic nature of local government on both formal and informal 
networks and relationships cannot be understated. Particularly in exurban or rural communities, 
the pool of actors who make decisions is likely to be small enough that such actors will know 
each other and have a working, if not personal, relationship (Oliver et al., 2012; Sharp, 2012). 
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Size and scope, along with the impact of local coalition-building that occurs between public and 
private sector organizations to facilitate development and define the character of urban regimes 
(Stone, 1989), can lead to particularly messy and interconnected networks of decision-makers. 
Thus, the importance of relationships and networks is considerable when assessing the impact of 
such factors on any decision.  
How do the perspectives of elected and administrative officials differ? There are a 
number of fundamental differences between elected and administrative officials and how they 
perceive their roles and priorities at the decision-making table. Some elected officials do not 
have an official seat at the table, but create and pass the legislation that is then used to set the 
parameters and legal boundaries within which certain decisions can be made (Finer, 1941) . In a 
similar process, citizens make their wants and needs known to the elected and administrative 
officials who represent them, and those actors can choose to take those needs into consideration 
in the decision-making process (Friedrich, 1940). While administrative officials are not elected, 
this does not mean they do not consider the political ramifications of their decisions, in particular 
when it comes to the internal political nature of their own organizations (Meier, 1987; Stillman, 
2004). Elected and administrative officials not only have different responsibilities for a decision 
once it has been made, but meaningfully different priorities, resources, and expertise as well 
(Allison & Zelikow, 1971; Bryner, 1987). 
At the local level, conflict may exist between elected and administrative officials, 
particularly over the distribution of resources in a given municipality (Cingranelli, 1981). This 
may include elected officials providing input on administrative fees (Debus et al., 2013), or 
executives having veto power over most legislative and administrative policy formulation (Fox, 
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1974). Evidence suggests that bureaucrats prefer powerful elected officials, so long as they are 
mission-oriented and provide support for administrative goals (Gains et al., 2008). Finally, it 
must be considered that since electoral and governmental systems vary widely across municipal 
governments, it may prove difficult to fully assess the impact of the administrative-elected 
official relationships in a generalizable way (Stone et al., 1986). 
Local administrative officials may focus on a more practical and resource-oriented 
perspective, which differs from the more political perspective of local elected officials. In 
particular, elected officials may be less concerned with “decision rules” intended to eliminate 
disparity, as well as more focused on the political consequences as opposed to the health and 
welfare of citizens (Lipsky, 1980; Meier et al., 1991). However, the priorities for both groups at 
the local level remain similar: adequate resources, effective implementation, and a focus on the 
problem at hand. Even given that baseline, administrators may need to push back against the 
coalition of elected officials and the business community, who may be more concerned with 
development and economic prosperity for corporate interests, to promote the public good and the 
values of equity and quality of life (Stone, 1989).  
Who holds responsibility and accountability for decisions and policy? Officials at any 
level of government will be held responsible by the public, either electorally or otherwise, for 
inaction, wrong action, and ineffective policy. This is true both for failed policies, and for 
successful policies that benefit from both public and expert support (Appleby, 1949; Barnard, 
1938; Friedrich, 1940). There is an inherent “muddling of the lines” when it comes to 
responsibility and accountability, as administrative agencies are often responsible for 
implementing and enforcing a decision while legislative bodies oversee them (Bryner, 1987). 
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Accountability and responsibility, fair or unfair, will often fall on administrative agencies and 
officials due to myths about the poor performance and excessive power of bureaucracy, as well 
as the difficulty in measuring performance in these agencies (Goodsell, 2003). 
Accountability and responsibility become more difficult to define at the local level, 
where municipal governments are particularly fragmented, and jurisdiction may become blurred 
or completely opaque. Responsibility may be assigned to a group of agencies, but ensuring 
accountability can be challenging (Fox, 1974). While local bureaucrats may support the presence 
of a powerful elected executive, there is no evidence to suggest that this is based on the fact that 
the executive would be held accountable for policy (Gains et al., 2008). This is not to say, 
however, that accountability and responsibility are not significant factors in citizen perception of 
local government. Municipal officials often endure most of the criticism from citizens for 
problems including poverty, transportation, law enforcement, and effective service delivery. 
Whether or not this is deserved, or whether they provide adequate response and are held truly 
accountable, varies depending on the municipality in question (Stone et al., 1986). 
Finally, depending on the amount of power in neighborhood organizations and other 
outside pressure groups, local elected and administrative officials may be held accountable for 
failures and successes in policy more effectively than national officials (Sharp, 2012). This may 
play out at the ballot box for elected officials, as voters in local elections often vote on specific 
policy issues that impact them and they are often aware of the officials who have successfully 
lobbied for or against that issue.  
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Policy Feedback, Social Construction, and Relative Power 
To understand how the policy formulation process is impacted by policy feedback, we 
must first look to previous understandings of the role policy feedback plays in Lasswell’s (1956) 
policy cycle. In most understandings of this cycle, policy feedback is understood to be one single 
element, occurring within the monitoring and evaluation stage of the cycle, wherein 
policymakers collect and consider feedback from citizens that might help to improve future 
policy. Over time, however, the theoretical implications of policy feedback have evolved. 
Tracing a brief intellectual history of policy feedback will allow for a more comprehensive 
understanding of the contemporary view of the feedback process.  
Policy feedback was first introduced by Schattschneider (1935), who wrote that policies 
can help to create new politics, which in turn lead to the creation of new policy. While this is a 
broad understanding of policy feedback, it is narrowly situated at a single point of entry in the 
policy process: after the creation and implementation of a given policy. Further, the implication 
of this particular conceptualization is that the outcomes of a policy may influence later policy-
making, but that influence will be mitigated in large part by politics. Lowi (1972) conceived of 
policy feedback in a similar way, adding that public policy is representative of the values and 
interests of a state, and that policies may institutionalize themselves within the context of a 
democracy (Lowi, 1985). 
Skocpol (1992) extended policy feedback over time, as well as noting the implications of 
historical policy for the formulation process of contemporary policy. In particular, she wrote that 
a program that paid out pensions for veterans after the Civil War generated both positive 
feedback, in the form of group mobilization to expand and protect pensions, as well as negative 
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feedback, with some policymakers seeing them as naked political patronage. These feedback 
effects, according to Skocpol, continue into the twentieth century and influence the creation or 
lack thereof, of social welfare programs in the early part of that century. While this form of 
feedback shows the direct link between policies at “Time 1,” group mobilization, and policies at 
“Time 2,” it still maintains a single point of entry in the cycle, after the implementation of a 
policy.  
Pierson (1993) advanced the theory of policy feedback by generating a framework and a 
testable hypothesis for scholars to study and understand policy feedback as a force in 
policymaking. According to Pierson, policy can shape political behavior through interpretive 
effects, including sources of information and the generation of meaning for citizens. In this 
framework, it can also shape that behavior through resource effects, as policies often provide 
means and incentives for citizens. Again, however, this framework maintains a specific point of 
entry to the process. Even as policy feedback advances as a theoretical framework, many 
scholars have maintained this single point of entry for feedback to the process.  
In a broader and more contemporary understanding of policy feedback, scholars such as 
Campbell (2003); Mettler and SoRelle (2014); Moynihan and Soss (2014); Soss and Schram 
(2007), and Weaver and Lerman (2010) see feedback as ever-present. For these scholars, 
feedback is how the public shifts their own conceptions of citizenships and the large structural 
forces shaping policy agendas and formulation. They see policy feedback as an explanatory 
frame for understanding how policy design and formulation is impacted by and sometimes 
predicated upon the populations that will receive a given policy’s benefits and costs. This new 
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policy feedback includes the structural biases and social constructions of policy makers, even if 
they are not actively engaged in a formal feedback process.  
In fact, in this understanding of policy feedback, policies themselves help define status, 
citizenship, and the extent of political engagement among citizens. If the design and 
implementation of a particular program is conducted in such a way as to negatively impact how 
individuals conceive of their citizenship, they are likely to come away with a more negative view 
of how their concerns would be received by government officials were they to express them 
(Mettler & Soss, 2004). This is clearly seen in the varying treatment of recipients of Social 
Security and those who receive Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Social 
Security recipients are validated as “deserving” citizens through their treatment by street-level 
bureaucrats administering that program, while TANF recipients have negative, demeaning and 
threatening experiences at the same level (Campbell, 2003; Mettler & Soss, 2004). 
The social construction of populations is delineated by specific categories and definitive 
positions within the axes of power and deservedness for multiple groups of citizens, as per the 




Figure 2. Power and deservedness typology. Adapted from “Democratic policy design: Social 
construction of target populations” by A. Schneider and P. de Leon, in P. A. Sabatier (Ed.), Theories of 
the Policy Process (p. 111), 2014, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.  
As demonstrated by Kreitzer and Watts Smith (2018) in a crowdsourced study of citizen 
perceptions, these constructions can be contentious. In particular, citizens clearly perceive some 
groups as being more deserving than Schneider et al. (2014) originally proposed. However, 
Kreitzer and Watts Smith also note that their findings support the idea that “not all policy 
enhances democracy (p. 13),” with very few groups being seen as advantaged (both powerful and 
deserving), while more groups were perceived to be contenders (powerful but undeserving) than 
in the original study. One potential reason for this may be found in the differences in perceptions 
between citizens and government officials, and such differences should be explored further. This 
project, to a limited extent, will provide some of this early exploration.  
Policies can be formulated in such a way as to pressure certain groups to shoulder costs 
or to receive benefits, and such design is both intentional and based on feedback from previous 
policies on similar issues (Jordan & Matt, 2014). Policies such as Social Security or TANF also 
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frame societal problems for citizens, casting blame and pushing messages about the relative 
deservedness and power of the groups targeted by the policy. As media and public narratives 
take shape, the recipients of policy benefits are reconstructed, both in the eyes of the public and 
within their own self-conceptions of citizenship (Mettler & Soss, 2004). Citizens’ perceptions of 
their place within the political and social hierarchy change based on their receipt of benefits or 
costs, and this in turn impacts their political engagement, their ability to mobilize and demand 
change, and their overall sense of efficacy (Soss, 1999). This results in a negative feedback loop, 
as policies reinforce negative perceptions, shaping narratives around certain citizen groups while 
those same groups become demobilized and disenfranchised due to this feedback. As this occurs, 
citizens become less likely to be successful in any demand for policies that bolster their 
citizenship, and they become permanent residents at the far end of the spectrum of influence.  
Furthermore, street-level bureaucrats may also engage in this process through how they 
interact with clients. Engaging with their roles as situated bureaucrats requires street-level 
workers to construct professional and personal identities for themselves, which may impact how 
they serve clients. These identities are impact by the race, class, and gender of the bureaucrats, as 
well as the professional environment in which they serve (Watkins-Hayes, 2009a). These 
interactions between street-level workers and citizens have an impact on the policy feedback 
process and are an integral part of understanding how policy feedback is inherent in the practice 
of public policy, and not just within theoretical understandings of the process.  
Bureaucratic power is part of a broader scholarly conversation that includes bureaucratic 
autonomy, politics, and political control of the bureaucracy. However, it is the flexing of that 
power that can provide the most insight into how bureaucrats and bureaucracies interact with the 
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policy-making process, particularly when it comes to policy formulation. Bureaucrats within our 
federal system have possessed power and autonomy since the founding of the United States, but 
that power increased in the late 19th century, as domestic policy became more complicated due to 
the rapidly expanding country and the emergence of new technologies. Such power, of course, is 
conditional and based on both the autonomy of a given agency as well as the unique capacities 
and legitimacy granted to that organization (Carpenter, 2001).  
Bureaucracies are politically active, and increasingly autonomous as networked 
governance becomes the norm and administrators are tasked with a broad range of tasks and 
collaborative structures that they must navigate (Carpenter, 2001). As the autonomy of agencies 
has grown, the reputation and legitimacy of those agencies have become increasingly influential 
measurements against which the relative power of those actors is judged. Reputation exists along 
four dimensions: performative, moral, procedural, and technical (Carpenter & Krause, 2012). 
These dimensions are intended to present the agency differently to different audiences, including 
the media, Congress, and the public. Presenting themselves differently before different audiences 
is inherently political, and as such agencies use these reputational dimensions to generate 
political power. It is that power which allows individuals within those agencies to represent the 
values and goals of that agency at the bargaining table and use that power to shift a particular 
decision or policy towards their organization.  
Outside of reputation, institutional design can also impact the power of an agency. While 
some agencies are politically isolated, operating with a managerial context on uncontroversial 
issues, others are highly political and work closely with their respective congressional oversight 
committees or other oversight bodies. It remains unclear, however, the extent to which structure 
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and reputation matter when viewed as the result of political isolation (Krause & Douglas, 2005). 
While most studies of bureaucratic power have focused on structure, reputation, and how 
agencies behave within the larger organized system of government, scholars have neglected to 
study how the internal dynamics of organizations, including decision-making, present themselves 
in the greater political context. In fact, according to Moe (2006), there has been a bifurcation 
within this subfield, where some scholars study public administration through the lens of politics 
while others study it through the lens of organizations. In reality, he writes, such a dichotomy is 
not useful and should be combined into the study of politics within organizations, perhaps in 
such a way that might take influences from new institutionalism, economics, and sociology 
(Moe, 2006).  
While bureaucratic power can be discussed in an abstract way, and observed in a broad 
political context, it can also be observed in practice through the actions of street-level agencies 
and bureaucrats. Soss, Fording, and Schram (2011) conducted a study of “poverty governance,” 
demonstrating how the government has regulated and governed low-income communities over 
decades. The authors centralize race in their understanding of this governance, and demonstrate 
that certain government programs and agencies, including those that engage in the distribution of 
welfare, corrections, and policing have significant autonomy and power within low-income and 
minority communities. This power, far from being an abstract influence on bargaining for certain 
policies, has a significant and negative impact on the population being served. Paternalism, 
neoliberal ideology, and the racial constructions of target populations all generate policy 
outcomes that result in a “disciplining” of the poor, wherein powerful local agencies exert 
control over citizens without recourse. 
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Soss and Weaver (2017) expand upon this idea, using the city of Ferguson, Missouri as a 
case study in race-class subjugated (RCS) communities. In these communities, the authors 
propose, policing has become a powerful part of everyday life for citizens. Poverty governance 
and carceral policies are the norm, not the exception, and encounters with the justice system are 
the primary form of citizen-government interaction. This is significant, as citizens in these 
communities view bureaucratic power as police power, and vice versa. The two are inextricably 
linked, and as police in these communities are increasingly expected to become “urban problem 
solvers,” the power and legitimacy granted to them increases. According to the authors, in RCS 
communities police help to define race, gender, citizenship, and political power of citizens. This 
dynamic is an additional way to define and observe bureaucratic power in practice and is perhaps 
one of the more powerful dynamics at work when considering bureaucratic power at the local 
level. While bureaucratic power is often used to describe the relative institutional power of 
agencies, in this model of bureaucratic politics bureaucratic power is expressed through the 
relative influence of each agency’s representative. Therefore, although it is the individual that is 
considered within this model, it is important to also recognize the institutional power and 
pressures that each brings to the bargaining table.  
Bureaucratic Typologies  
To understand the interplay between the specific interests of those involved in the 
decision-making process and the structural forces of policy feedback, it is necessary to also 
briefly review the existing literature on bureaucratic power and political control, which assesses 
the ways in which political and administrative actors interact and cooperate in multiple contexts. 
This work is situated within the subset of literature that considers how and where bureaucrats 
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have the ability to exercise power and influence. Studies of local government have shown that 
bureaucrats have substantial power within those systems, as municipal governance is often 
managerial-based and focused on performance and results (Gains et al., 2008; Oliver et al., 2012; 
Sharp, 2012; Stensöta, 2011). In situating this revised understanding of bureaucratic politics 
squarely as an explanatory framework for how policy feedback plays out in policy formulation, 
as well as considering its relevance to the existing literature on bureaucratic power, the 
framework will be strengthened with regard to its explanatory power. 
Typologies of bureaucrats have often proved useful in understanding the decision-making 
processes of large bureaucracies and the relative power of the actors within them. Downs (1967) 
describes two unique categories of bureaucratic officials, each of which contains several 
subtypes. First, self-interested officials, including “climbers” who attempt to maximize their own 
power through promotion, financial benefit, or status; and “conservers,” who attempt to preserve 
their job security and status quo above all else. Second, mixed-motive officials, including 
“zealots,” who remain loyal to specific policies and values; “advocates,” who behave similarly 
while representing a broader set of policies or an entire organization; and “statesmen,” who 
proclaim loyalty to the state and society. For Downs (1967), this typology proves explanatory for 
the decision-making process in a large bureaucracy. Therefore, it may be useful to look for 
analogues within the literature on local government.  
According to Fox (1974), municipal executives often see their role in the context of five 
categories: reformer, program politician, evader, stooge, or mediator. Each role consists of 
different values and interests (Fox, 1974), while social values and quality of life concerns may 
impact decisions made by the executive and other actors (Debus et al., 2013; Gottdiener, 1987). 
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In assessing these common attributes, it is useful to assign new categories, which form a 
typology not only of federal bureaucrats or local government executives, but of all local 
government officials. By combining the attributes of the bureaucrat and that of the local 
government executive, who is often considered an extension of the bureaucratic state focused on 
managerial matters, and an administrator first and foremost, we find the above-referenced five 
categories: the Egoist, the Traditionalist, the Follower, the Technician, and the Glad-hander. 
These types will serve a critical purpose in the conceptual model of local bureaucratic politics 
developed here, as they may help to delineate commonalities between actors, both political and 
administrative, whose priorities may be similar or even identical. Such commonalties may exist 
within a particular case or may even extend across cases (i.e.: A Traditionalist in Manchester 
may conduct themselves in a similar way to a Traditionalist in Flint). However, the two 




Figure 3. Common attributes of a synthesized typology. 
To summarize, when ambiguous policies and procedures are put into place and 
government officials are given the ability to make a judgment of deservedness on those who 
come to them for services, the impact on the citizenship of those receiving service can be 
significant. In particular, if the formulation and narrative of a policy is negative, it may 
disenfranchise, demobilize, and create feelings of inefficacy among the group it serves. They 
may feel that they are powerless, less worthy, and undeserving of quality service. Understanding 
the social construction of populations is critical to understanding how certain policies are 
formulated, and the ways in which policy design impacts policy outcomes. In addition, the power 
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of the bureaucrat and the agency they represent is relevant to how and why decisions are made. 
Based on this interpretation of the literature, it is reasonable to suggest that the intentionality of 
those conducting policy formulation, including during a crisis, is influenced by four primary 
considerations:  
o The social construction of populations who receive the benefits and costs of the 
policy, to be demonstrated through demographic data and the social construction 
typologies of Schneider et al. (2014). 
o The specific interests of those designing the policy and the power they have to 
promote those interests over others, to be demonstrated in a content analysis of 
city council meetings and first-hand accounts of the policy-making process.  
o The external influences on the policymakers, including those from within and 
outside government, to be demonstrated by a similar analysis of public records of 
council meeting participants and first-hand accounts. 
o The specific individuals engaged in the policy formulation process, and their 
typologies and distinct strategies to accomplish objectives.  
These considerations will provide a useful reference when assessing the eventual 
outcomes and decisions of the two cases that this work considers. With the relevant literature 
reviewed and specific questions about the utility of this theory in the context of local government 
answered, I turn now to developing a visual representation of this revised framework. Chapter III 
lays out this framework in detail, along with an explanation of the methods used to explore it in 
both case studies presented here. Further, an explanation of the choice of case studies along with 
a brief description of those cases sets the stage for Chapters IV and V.  
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Chapter III: A Revised Framework 
As evidenced by the body of research on local government analyzed in Chapter II that 
considers decision-making and the policy process, including the roles played by both citizens and 
officials, it is clear that local officials engage in bureaucratic politics, albeit with different 
priorities, processes, and purposes than those at the federal or state level. To better understand 
exactly how local officials represent themselves in these situations I have developed, from the 
key questions proffered in Chapter II, a framework of local bureaucratic politics that can help to 
explain the processes of bureaucratic politics at the local level. This framework reconciles the 
observations on the practice of local democracy and bureaucracy elucidated by Fox (1974); Levy 
et al. (1974); Oliver et al. (2012); Sharp (2012); Stone (1989), while concurrently building a 
framework based on the fundamentals of bureaucratic politics proposed by Allison and Zelikow 
(1971); Halperin and Clapp (1974); and Meier (1987). It takes into account both the existing 
structure of decision-making in the foundational literature, while including new variables and 
considerations necessary to assess this process at the local level.  
My revised framework (Figure 4) considers how the unique characteristics, structures, 
and power dynamics of local government will influence policymaking. The elements of the 
framework are based on the fundamental questions posed previously regarding the assumptions 
of bureaucratic politics, and Table 1 includes these factors within four groups, including 
Interests, Relationships, Environmental Factors, and Organizational factors, allowing for a 
simpler visual representation of them in the model. Additionally, the model is constructed in 
such a way as to consider the influences of policy feedback, social construction, bureaucratic 





Factors Examples Selected Authors 




Relationships Personal, political, 
professional 
Appleby, Halperin & Clapp, 
Oliver, Stone, Sharp,  
Environmental Factors Resources, local 
idiosyncrasies, political 
culture 
Allison & Zelikow, Bryner, 
Oliver, Sharp, Stone 
Organizational Factors Professionalism, rules and 
norms, mission 






Social Construction The elite and citizen perceptions of 
populations who will receive the benefits and 
costs of a policy. 
Bureaucratic Power The exercise of power to promote the specific 
interests of those designing a policy over 
other interests.  
Policy Feedback The impact policy has on politics, and the 
resultant influence those politics have on 
future policy. 






Figure 4. A conceptual model of bureaucratic politics for local government. 
As the actors around the “bargaining table” interact within formal and informal policy-
making settings, they represent their own interests, relationships, environmental, and 
organizational factors. These interactions are mitigated or promoted by the influence of 
bureaucratic power, policy feedback, social construction, and/or bureaucratic typology, and 
eventually a policy decision is reached. To explore the advantages and limitations of this 
conceptual model, this project takes a constructivist and transformative approach, using mixed-
methodologies to investigate the propositions set out in Chapter I. While the structure of the 
analysis may read at times similar to a traditional case-study, this is with the intention of 
delineating temporal and spatial boundaries within the research, and not intended to provide data 
that are strictly comparative in the traditional sense. To that end, the cases presented are 
developed primarily to meet four criteria: construct validity, or establishing correct operational 
measures; internal validity, or establishing distinctions between spurious and causal 
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relationships; external validity, or establishing the extent to which the cases can be generalized; 
and reliability, or establishing whether or not the study might be replicated. By meeting these 
four criteria, it is proposed that these case studies will be useful for the process of theory building 
and development (Diaz Andrade, 2009; Yin, 2017).  
The primary sources of data for this project are observations (developed into mini 
ethnographies) by the primary investigator, publicly available city council meeting minutes, and 
semi-structured interviews. Observations were conducted over a 7-10-day period in each city in 
March 2018 (Flint) and April 2018 (Manchester). These ethnographic observations are recorded 
at the beginning of each case, along with photographic representations of each city and 
respective crisis. The methodology used to operationalize these observations is described below, 
and the process also served as an opportunity to engage with the positionality of the research in 
the context of each city. 
To develop a comprehensive dataset of meeting minutes to code within the context of this 
model, a search of the city council records in each city was undertaken, covering 2013-2017, the 
most recent five years available. This timeframe is based on the fact that both the water crisis in 
Flint and the opioid crisis in Manchester are ongoing, and both have roots that can be traced to 
2013 (Graham, 2016b; Soucy & O'Higgins, 2016). All public meeting minutes of the full city 
legislative body in each case were included in the dataset, and the timeline includes the peak of 
each crisis, which is shown in Figure 8 and Figure 15. This dataset consists of 139 documents in 
the Flint case, and 159 documents in the Manchester case. All meetings were included in the 
dataset, though as described below, not all meetings were analyzed based upon the content 
discussed within them. The length of meetings and number of speakers varied widely, and Flint 
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and Manchester record meeting minutes in different styles, making a comparison of the actual 
page length of the documents coded somewhat impractical and unhelpful. However, to provide 
some context and scale, the full dataset includes over 1000 PDF pages of minutes. 
Interviewees were contacted via snowball sampling, and all interviews were conducted in 
person whenever possible. Each interviewee is a potential actor as represented in the model, all 
of whom have first-hand knowledge of the political and administrative process around the issues 
at play in the specific case for which they were interviewed. Six individuals were interviewed in 
Flint, and seven individuals were interviewed in Manchester. They included city and state 
managers and street-level bureaucrats, non-profit executives, and public-sector union leadership.  
The model is operationalized through three specific methodologies. These methodologies 
were chosen with the intention of creating the first three “interpretative moments” characterized 
by Yanow (2006); first-hand experience or relaying of first-hand experience, sense-making of 
that experience, and the experience of word-making and writing. First, a mini-ethnography was 
conducted for each case, both to situate the researcher within the context of the study to provide 
“thick” description and a relevant background of each case for the reader, developing first-hand 
experience into data (Fusch & Ness, 2017; Geertz, 1973). Second, the meeting minutes were 
coded utilizing a combination of interpretative content analyses and textual analyses intended to 
provide a democratic character to the interpretation of the data, as well as create meaning from 
the social reality of those whose words and actions are being analyzed (Yanow, 2006). Further, 
narrative inquiry in the tradition of stories for research and associated coding were utilized 
within the context of semi-structured interviews to create a holistic and descriptive account of 
two cities and their successes and challenges in creating policy to deal with a contemporary 
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public health and safety crisis (S. Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2006). The use of these methods 
allows for triangulation not only of the data, but of the methodology as well, providing a robust 
foundation for the findings of this study (Fusch & Ness, 2017).  
Mini-Ethnographies: The Experience  
While classic ethnography may take months, or even years, a focused or mini-
ethnography is conducted over the span of days or weeks (Fusch & Ness, 2017). While 
ethnography has been criticized for allowing research bias to infuse studies, and an overall lack 
of objectivity, its use in conjunction with other methods allows for methodological pluralism to 
help mitigate these factors. In this context, the mini-ethnography “sets the stage,” providing thick 
description, representing experienced and observed realities, and framing the acute nature of the 
problems at hand in these two cases (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2011; Fusch & Ness, 2017). 
While the mini ethnographies presented here are in no way conclusory, they present both the 
positionality of the researcher and the particular idiosyncrasies of the cases. Positionality refers 
to the researcher’s relationship with the community being studied, particularly as relates to race, 
gender, socioeconomic status, and other potential inequalities between the researcher and the 
research subject. While positionality cannot be removed, it can be recognized and addressed. 
Best practices for addressing positionality include recognizing ones insider or outsider status 
within the population being studied, recognizing one’s own cultural, racial, and ethnic heritage as 
it compares to the studied population, and recognizing the systemic and institutional forces at 
play for the interviewees (Milner, 2007; Wiederhold, 2015).  
Field notes and reflective journaling, two traditional ethnographic data collection 
methods, were the primary sources of data for this method. Along with photographs, they create 
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a representation of the case to be studied, creating a frame for the reader through which to view 
the analysis (Emerson et al., 2011; Fusch & Ness, 2017; Prosser & Schwartz, 2004). Each 
ethnography attempts to speak to the authenticity, plausibility, and criticality of the case. To 
demonstrate authenticity and plausibility, they note the details of everyday life, explain 
relationships that will be explored, position the work as relevant to the audience, “legitimize the 
atypical” and “normalize unorthodox methodologies.” Further, they ask the audience to examine 
the assumptions that underlie their own work and their perceptions of this work, promoting an 
appeal to criticality (Golden-Biddle & Locke, 1993). 
Textual Analysis and Membership Categorization: The Meetings 
All public meeting minutes were coded in Atlas.ti by date and city, and each case was 
analyzed separately. The data were obtained from publicly available sources, including the city 
websites of each municipality and directly from the City Clerk’s offices. The coding process was 
iterative and reflected a traditional approach of reading and rereading materials to better search 
for key attributes and themes, as is often done in research of this nature (Peräkylä, 2011). 
Following is a description of the formal process by which the materials were first coded. 
To develop a sample of relevant city council meeting minutes, the first step was to 
conduct a content analysis, first coding for the word water to identify each time the water crisis 
may have been discussed. Each document containing water was then coded for a thematic 
reference to the crisis, eliminating discussion of irrelevant policies and issues. This process was 
intended to develop an accurate dataset, to provide a substantive basis on which to apply an 
objective coding scheme (Berg, 2003). Once this was complete, a modified membership 
categorization analysis (MCA) was conducted, searching for meaning in the “normative and 
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cognitive forms” of the units being analyzed, in this case the meetings themselves (Peräkylä, 
2011). While MCA is traditionally used to categorize people, in this case it was used to 
categorize moments within the city council meeting, delineating the space and time of a 
particular reference to the water crisis. In concert with the first-hand experience and word-
making process, this allowed for the specific references themselves to serve as evidence within 
the model, representing the various influences of bureaucratic politics within the context of the 
city council meeting.  
Comments by both elected and administrative officials were included, as were those by 
citizens and individuals representing private entities. As the preceding literature review 
describes, scholars of local government have found that local administrators and elected officials 
often have similar goals and attributes, and that both categories fill similar roles and archetypes 
within local democracy and governance (Fox, 1974; Oliver et al., 2012; Sharp, 2012). This view 
of the local elected official as a managerial figure and the bureaucrat as a policymaker, is 
fundamental to the analysis presented here. To that end, rather than to first separate individuals 
by their job titles, the coding process conducted here separates them first and foremost by their 
values and priorities. In addition, comments and interactions that involved citizens and private 
entities were also coded to facilitate a comparative analysis of how city council members interact 
and respond to each group. As this project focused on how values and interests are acted upon in 
the context of the council meeting, the coding focused primarily on those values and interests.  
The codebook itself is attached as Appendix A, and the coding scheme is developed 
directly out of the literature review preceding this chapter. Meeting minutes were coded for 
references to interests, both public and private, that were represented in front of the city council 
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at each meeting. Interactions between council members and outside individuals were coded as 
relationships, with reference to the specific organization or interest being represented by the 
outside individual. Within this code group, an individual’s role (bureaucrat, citizen, or otherwise) 
is indicated. Approximately 6% of the interactions and comments coded involved citizens, 10% 
involved elected officials outside of the city council, 37% involved bureaucrats, and 47% 
involved private interests such as businesses or non-profits. All interactions involved, to some 
extent, city council members. Organizational and environmental factors, such as the exercise of 
power, allocation of resources, and the mission and role of the council itself and any outside 
organization being represented in front of it were also recorded, to capture the dynamics of who 
and what received a formal hearing in front of the council. Within these categories, each of the 
individual codes is defined in further detail in Appendix A. 
Stories for Research: The Interviews  
Interviews and observational research were conducted on-site in Flint and Manchester. In 
both cities, I observed a public city council meeting and subcommittee meeting in order to 
provide context and “thick description” of the legislative body of that city (Geertz, 1973). 
Additionally, based on availability and willingness to participate, semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with relevant administrators about the issue at hand, as well as with activists or 
community leaders focused on these issues or on citizens personally impacted by them. In total, 
between 6-10 individuals were interviewed in each city. These interviews followed an adapted 
story-telling approach (Kim, 2015), as conceptualized in Cops, Teachers, Counselors (S. 
Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2006; S. W. Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003) and Pulled Over 
(Epp, Maynard-Moody, & Haider-Markel, 2014). These interviews support the conclusions of 
45 
 
each proposition, and in particular are helpful in addressing the validity of (2a) and (2b), which 
are concerned with citizen mobilization and activism, factors that cannot be fully captured 
through content analysis alone.  
Open-ended questions were posed in part based upon the information obtained in the 
coding of council meetings, media sources, and an analysis of the demographic data as indicated 
above. By assessing whether and how the stories of individuals involved and affected by the 
policymaking and implementation process track with the analysis of publicly available 
information, a holistic picture of the policy-making process in each case emerged. In addition, 
these stories provided relevant information about the impact of policy feedback on the response 
to policies in these communities. The interviews were coded for evidence of particular 
bureaucratic typologies, and then for references to social construction, policy feedback, and other 
influences that might have shaped that individual’s perception of the relevant issue. In this way, 
the interviews serve as relevant data that is analyzed along the same thematic pathways as the 
city council meeting minutes, indicating whether the propositions put forward by this proposal 
are indeed accurate. 
Each interviewee was also coded as one of the adapted municipal bureaucrat typologies 
developed out of the typologies synthesized from Fox (1974) and Downs (1967). To make this 
assessment, their responses to questions about their priorities and views on city government were 
matched against the attributes described in Figure 3. While brief interviews, observations, and 
interactions are not as effective as a psychological exam or an extended and anonymous 
observation, these interactions nevertheless provide some insight into which categories these 
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individuals fit. Further work in this area, as discussed in the conclusion to this project, may prove 
useful in continuing to develop these typologies and their measurements. 
By utilizing multiple methods and sources of data, the validity, authenticity, plausibility, 
and criticality of each case is addressed and defined, allowing for reasonable conclusions to be 
reached (Diaz Andrade, 2009; Golden-Biddle & Locke, 1993). While these cases are strong 
evidence of the utility of the framework presented here, the limitations of this approach are 
recognized and will be addressed in Chapter VI. With this in mind, Chapter IV will present the 
case of water quality in Flint, Michigan, and explore how the framework proposed here is 




Chapter IV: Flint, Michigan 
Flint, Michigan sits in the space between Michigan’s thumb and mitten, a city whose 
history echoes the mass movements of the 20th century: industrialization, labor, civil rights, and 
globalization. It is a city where race and class have always been at the forefront of the public 
sphere, perhaps undiscussed, but nevertheless deeply woven throughout the city in explicit and 
disparate ways. Abandoned buildings and enormous automotive plants surround a bustling 
downtown, and references to the history of auto-making in Michigan are inescapable. Ignored for 
years, with the exception of quick notations in the national news that another automaker had 
moved their operations to foreign soil, Flint became a household name once again following a 
series of events that led to what is now colloquially known as the Flint Water Crisis, outlined 
below. 
In 2011, Governor Rick Snyder appointed an emergency financial manager for the City 
of Flint after the city went into receivership earlier that year. A state review board gave the 
governor the power to appoint an emergency financial manager until the city had regained 
financial footing, and over the next several years, a series of emergency managers controlled the 
city government with broad authority to set the priorities and policies for the city. In 2014, 
Emergency Manager Ed Kurtz made the decision, with the approval of numerous other parties, to 
switch the water supply of the city from the Detroit City Water District to the Karegnondi Water 
District to save money.  
While the City of Flint planned to build a pipeline to connect to the Karegnondi Water 
District, an interim source of water was needed. Beginning in 2014, Kurtz and the management 
of the City of Flint chose to pump water directly from the Flint River to resident’s homes without 
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treating the water to the extent required by the EPA. In turn, the untreated and acidic water from 
the river corroded the pipes serving the city, which contained lead under their exterior coatings, 
resulting in exceptionally high levels of lead leeching into the water. High levels of lead, along 
with other contaminants from both the untreated water itself and the resulting corrosion of the 
pipes, were reported by numerous independent testers throughout 2014 and 2015 (Davis et al., 
2016, March 21; Graham, 2016b; Longley, 2011).  
For the next several years, following tests that clearly showed numerous issues with 
water quality in Flint, city and state officials communicated with each other in an attempt to 
determine if there was enough of a problem to require a switch back to the Lake Huron water 
supply. Though events such as General Motors choosing to stop using water from the Flint River 
in their production facilities, a switch to only bottled water in state offices in Flint, the disclosure 
of undesirable test results and continued pressure by community activists to address the issue, 
there was no significant action taken by the government of Flint or the State of Michigan 
(Hanna-Attisha, LaChance, Sadler, & Schnepp, 2016; Nickels, 2019).  
Despite this lack of action, there continued to be substantial communication and 
coordination between the two levels of government as well, as with officials from regulatory 
agencies and administrative agencies at the local, state, and federal level (Graham, 2016a). This 
collection of actors did not produce policy that served the public interest. Instead, government 
officials engaged in an effort to spin test results, limit public knowledge of the lead levels in the 
water, and ignored increasingly focused advocacy by environmental groups and concerned 
citizens (Howell, Doan, & Harbin, 2019). Finally, in September of 2015, Professor Marc 
Edwards and his team at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University released the results 
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of their extensive water quality testing conducted in Flint. Accompanying media coverage was 
widespread and highly critical of local and state officials (Davis et al., 2016, March 21).  
The Flint case demonstrates several important elements of local bureaucratic response to 
a crisis. First, that in the context of a financial crisis and under the authority of an emergency 
manager practicing austerity measures, both politicians and administrators tend towards 
prioritizing cost-savings over policies oriented towards public health and safety. Second, that 
there is reason to believe that the population of Flint, which is majority-Black and has high rates 
of public benefit usage, is socially constructed as less deserving of those policies, based on the 
responses to the crisis by those in authority. Third, as the case supports the framework of 
bureaucratic politics as proposed, it suggests that future case studies following this model will be 
useful in developing a theoretical approach to understand crisis response in local government.  
Understanding the particulars of the crisis required not only reviewing city council 
meeting minutes and conducting interviews, but also engaging with the city as a physical space. 
Over the course of nearly a week, I took photographs, visited cultural and historic landmarks, 
spoke with workers at convenience stores, restaurants, and retail establishments, and recorded 
fieldnotes documenting my experiences. In doing so, I engaged critically with my own 
assumptions about Flint and its citizens, positioning myself and my analysis within the broader 
context as well as the sociopolitical and racial context of Flint. Following is a brief mini-
ethnography, in the tradition of Geertz’s (1973) “thick description,” that documents several 






To this day, I won't use it because if our bathrooms sit over the weekend, when we turn it 
off, that water's going to be brown. I don't care what anybody says. I'm not going to drink 
that. (Long-time employee of Flint City Hall). 
March 24, 2018: 11:58 p.m. Rob picked me up in an old minivan with the name 
“Veterans Taxi” on the side, waving me into the front seat. As he pulled out into the rainy 
evening, I asked how long he’d been driving a cab. “It’s my second job, well, after I got laid off 
now I do it more” he replied. Rob was wearing a bandana on his head in an outdated Axl Rose 
style, and in the cupholder between us there was a Big Gulp full of soda that he took long pulls 
from each time we stopped at a light. His van reeked of cigarettes, and the floor was covered in 
empty fast-food wrappers, outerwear, and an assortment of paper. 
We talked from the airport until he dropped me off at the Wingate in Grand Blanc, about 
a 15-minute drive from the airport and six miles outside of downtown Flint. He gets migraine 
headaches constantly, and he used to take something for them but now he has no health 
insurance. “[I] lost that from my job before the last one” he tells me. Rob has lived in Flint his 
whole life, and he is sure he could make more money driving for Uber in Detroit, but he feels 
more comfortable driving a licensed cab in Flint. His cluster headaches make him want to “lie 
down in a dark room.” He’s had head trauma twice, so it’s to be expected, but he never thought 
they would be this bad. He doesn’t volunteer any more information, and I don’t ask.  
Rob and his wife used to work at the General Motors plant, but they both lost their jobs 
and their house in the 2008 financial crisis. They had to start over, and he tells me that after that 
“we felt like teenagers.” They had both worked in the shop, a “good job” according to Rob, but 
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after the crash they became scared that if they got too comfortable it could all happen again. I 
asked if he still had any trust in the government or the banks after the crash, and he laughed, the 
only time during our trip, and muttered “no way.” Afterall, he had lost his house and lived in a 
hotel for five months. I asked if he considered himself lucky. He said yes. 
March 25, 2018: 10:05 a.m. I take the hotel shuttle back to the airport to pick up my 
rental car for the week. My driver is an older white woman who doesn’t talk. I walk back into the 
airport, busier now than when my late flight came in the day before. At the car rental counter, I 
spot a woman at the register. She has big earrings and long braids, and she dances around behind 
the counter as she helps the man in front of me with an insurance form. When I get to the 
counter, she asks why I’m here. When I tell her that it's to study city government, she groans and 
rolls her eyes. “Man, we were so excited with the new mayor, but then it’s just the same old 
stuff. They all break promises” she says to me, shaking her head. She hands me the keys to a 
silver Ford Focus. 
March 25, 2018: 10:48 a.m. At the Citgo station on West Hill Rd, I stop and buy bottled 
water, something I will do several times over the course of my trip. As I reach into my wallet to 
pay, I ask the clerk to add a lotto ticket and make a joke about playing in different states to see if 
my luck changes. He’s one of two white guys in their 20’s behind the counter, open cans of 
energy drink making rings on the Plexiglass of the lottery ticket case. They laugh, and one of the 
guys says he does the same thing too. He smirks at me and says “Well, enjoy your time in 
beautiful Flint, Michigan!” and they both laugh as I leave. I get the sense that he doesn't think the 
city is all that beautiful. 
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March 26, 2018: 5:22 p.m. There are more than a dozen people crammed into the small 
committee room, not including the members of the Special Affairs Committee, here to discuss 
several appointments by the Mayor, including City Administrator and Chief Financial Officer. 
The room is hot, maybe 14 feet square, and the brown carpet extends up the walls. There is one 
small window overlooking a parking lot, and in front of it sits the City Clerk and her assistant, 
behind a soundboard with microphones and cameras recording the meeting. The members of the 
committee are a diverse bunch, including three Black men and two Black women, two White 
women, a much older White man and a very young-looking Hispanic man with glasses. Every 
seat is full, and I’m not the only observer. It seems that I’ve chosen an important meeting, as the 
room buzzes until the Clerk calls the meeting to order.  
Throughout the next two hours, the tension is palpable. One by one, members of the 
Mayor’s staff (whose office is located just upstairs) enter the room and defend the appointments, 
though none of the appointed individuals attend, a fact noted by several council members. 
Questions about the appointees, in particular a former General Motors manager appointed as City 
Administrator and a young man with no public sector experience appointed as Chief Financial 
Officer, are fast and furious. A city attorney rebuffs the council’s suggestion that they conduct 
interviews, noting that traditionally their role has been to rubberstamp appointments.  
The mayor doesn’t appear to have many allies on the council, and several members seem 
to hint at nepotism or perhaps even corruption being at the root of these appointments. Another 
council member, who brashly and repeatedly references his time spent in prison, defends the 
mayor and notes that her office has done a good job managing the finances of the city. This view 
doesn’t appear to be supported by the rest of the council, several of whom seem to ignore the 
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comments, jumping back into where the previous discussion had left off. In the end, the CFO is 
approved, as are several other appointees, and a decision on the City Administrator is postponed 




The following photographs shown in Figure 5 were taken during my trip to Flint. 
Following the best practices set forward by Prosser and Schwartz (2004), I created a “visual 
diary” of my time in both Flint and Manchester. This technique, capturing a “precise moment in 
space and time,” serves as another method for creating the thick description and context 
described previously. As per Worth (1980), this is not a record of culture, which can only be 
constructed by those within a culture, but a record about culture, providing context not only to 














Figure 5. Photos taken in Flint, Michigan. Clockwise from upper left: “Greetings from Flint” by 
INDECLINE collective, 1721 Saginaw St.; auto worker sculpture at Flint City Hall by Suzanne Johnson, 
1101 Saginaw St.; photos of former city council members in the Council chambers, 1101 Saginaw St.; 
water fountain at the Sloan Museum, 1310 E. Kearsley St.; UAW Sitdowners Monument, 1940 W. 




Social Construction and Policy in Flint 
Table 3 below delineates specific demographic characteristics of Flint, and this chapter 
discusses what they might tell us about how social construction and policy feedback influences 
policy outcomes generated by the city council. This chapter then lays out the formal propositions 
described previously and uses data from Flint to address and respond to each. Finally, the chapter 
closes with a summary of the findings and a brief comment on the relevance of them to the larger 
project. 
Table 3 
Demographic Statistics (Flint) 
Race Estimate Percentage 
Total Population 100,569 100% 
White 42,826 42.6% 
Black or African American 58,307 58.0% 
All Other Census Categories 3,743 3.8% 
 
Employment Estimate Percentage 
In Labor Force 38,862 50.3% 
Employed 28,618 37.0% 
Unemployed 10,227 13.2% 
Not in Labor Force 38,451 49.7% 
 
Income Estimate Percentage 
Total Households 40,509 100% 
Less than $10,000 8,985 22.2% 
$10,000 to $14,999 4,040 10.0% 
$15,000 to $24,999 7,459 18.4% 
$25,000 to $24,999 5,312 13.1% 
$35,000 to $49,999 5,522 13.6% 
$50,000 to $74,999 5,329 13.2% 
$75,000 to $99,999 1,987 4.9% 
$100,000 to $149,999 1,428 3.5% 
$150,000 to $199,999 276 0.7% 




Welfare Benefits Estimate Percentage 
With Supplemental Security Income 5,882 14.5% 
With Cash Public Assistance Income 4,729 11.7% 
With Food Stamp/SNAP Benefits 17,455 43.1% 
Note. Adapted from American Community Survey (2014). Retrieved from 
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/ 
As can be reasonably inferred through the lens of both ethnographic experience and the 
data highlighted in the table above, a meaningful number of citizens of Flint are poor, minorities 
and/or recipients of government benefits. Within the theoretical framework of social 
construction, many of those citizens would fit into the low-power end of the Schneider et al. 
(2014) typology. This assessment of the population of Flint helps to define how these citizens are 
perceived both by themselves as well as by politicians and bureaucrats who enact policy that 
impacts them (Campbell, 2003).  
One important consideration when viewing these demographics is the impact of welfare 
policy. Campbell (2003); Riccucci (2005); Soss (1999); Soss and Schram (2007); Watkins-Hayes 
(2009b) have pointed out the various ways in which the construction of welfare policy, 
conceptions of the welfare state, and the social construction of welfare recipients has impacted 
both the design of welfare policy and public opinion of such policies (Mettler & Soss, 2004). The 
demographics of Flint, therefore, should leave no doubt that the impact of these constructions 
have significant meaning within the context of the water crisis.  
When bureaucratic and political actors make decisions, they must weigh the information 
available, bargain and cooperate, and eventually implement a policy or decision with the consent 
of those who participated in the decision-making process. In a democracy, citizens delegate their 
power to government officials, interest groups, and politicians (Appleby, 1949). When it comes 
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time to make a decision, these actors come together at the bargaining table, where certain groups 
and individuals are either drawn in or cut out from the process (Halperin & Clapp, 1974; Meier, 
1987). In Flint, the decision-making process was spearheaded by Governor Rick Snyder, Mayor 
Dayne Walling, and state-appointed emergency managers Ed Kurtz, Darnell Earley, and Gerald 
Ambrose. It also included the Flint city council, relevant city bureaucrats within the city of Flint, 
and officials from the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) and the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  
These actors came to the decision-making process, as all political and bureaucratic actors 
do, with parochial values, interests, and opinions (Barnard, 1938; Halperin & Clapp, 1974). They 
had varying levels of power, held different places within the formal hierarchy of their  
governments, and represented different constituencies (Rourke, 1969). However, the bargaining 
and cooperative nature of the decision-making process means that a single individual, no matter 
how powerful, must still seek the cooperation of other individuals to facilitate an enforceable 
outcome (Barnard, 1938). For the purposes of this analysis, I turn to the discourse around the 
water crisis in the context of the Flint City Council, and how an analysis of it can answer the 
propositions laid out in the first chapter of this work.  
Proposition 1: Municipal governments prioritize policies that focus on cost-saving 
measures. 
Proposition 1a. During the policy creation process, the individuals at the bargaining 
table prioritize parochial, political, and agency-specific interests over broader public 
interests, including health and safety. 
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Through the process of coding city council meeting minutes, it is shown that certain 
interests are represented in front of the council far more often compared to others. Take, for 
example, the occurrence of a council member requesting that the Flint Utilities Department 
refund customers who paid water bills during a “boil water advisory” for the neighborhood he 
represents: this issue is agency-specific, temporary, and provides rewards towards a particular 
area, and would therefore be coded as such. One example of a public-interest issue that appeals 
to the civic duty of the council or proposes a solution to a particular problem is the presentation 
of a report on the Flint’s water systems and sanitation processes. In many of these circumstances, 
multiple interests are being represented, and the quotation is coded as such. In Figure 6 below, 
the percentage of references to a specific type of interest (as compared to all references to other 
interests in the context of water crisis) from 2013-2017 are displayed. Out of a total of 152 coded 
interests, the figure below represents the percentage of references to each interest. Representing 
references to interests as percentages of a whole is done to facilitate future comparisons. 
 
Figure 6. Representation of interests by % (Flint). 
 











To better compare which categories of interests are represented above others, these 
subcategories are redefined into four themes: council politics (area rewards and electoral 
interests), self-interest (personal and agency), efficiency (managerial and temporary), and public 
good (civic duty and problem solving) and are illustrated in Figure 7. Political concerns, 
referring in this context to the politics of reelection among council members, occur most often 
(~30% of the time) relative to the other thematic streams, followed by public concerns (~29%). 
However, taken as a whole, the prioritization of council politics, efficiency and managerial 
concerns, and self-interest combined (~71%) is substantially higher than that of public concerns, 
with public concerns making up slightly less than one-third of the interests represented during 
what is ostensibly a discussion about a public health and safety issue. Many of these concerns 
thematically centered on the financial interests of the city of Flint and the private entities 
engaged in business before the city council.  
 










Council Politics Public Efficiency Self-Interest
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These findings suggest that while public interests are represented, they do not make up a 
majority or even a plurality of the interests that are discussed most often in the context of the 
water crisis. This is backed up by open-ended discussions with interviewees who work for or 
closely with the city council, the department of education, state government, and the mayor. 
Respondents were asked to tell the interviewer about a time they felt that certain interests (of any 
type) were being prioritized over others in front of the city council. Following are selected quotes 
on the subject, with the relevant evidence highlighted in yellow. 
 
And there are Flint dollars in there, so one of the things I've been doing lately, because 
there are some legislators that do not want that money to be there, because they don't 
think we should continue to fund public health programs in Flint. 
 
Yeah, yeah. I think the Administration [of Flint] didn't fight what the state wanted 
because they had things that they wanted. Again, politics. It's certain positions. It's grants. 
They said, "You give us this, we'll give you that. Don't fight us on this, we won't fight 
you on that." 
 
We've lost the fertility rate . . . so that obviously should be the first priority. Second 
priority should have been, "Why are we still allowing the kids to go to the schools and 





It just seems like the local government, say the water commission or the County Water 
Commission, at some level, they had to have known that something was wrong. I just 
don't see how that couldn't have happened. 
 
But the state owns–it's part of the state's company. So, we have to choose a source that 
the state is involved in. And it's the source that the state –it just tells me it's all too 
intermingled. I feel like if they had involved the Council from the beginning, they 
probably could've convinced them that this one's the best source. 
 
Other interviewees echoed similar themes, putting the blame on city officials for not 
pushing harder for a resolution to the crisis, as well as on state and federal authorities who had 
neglected their responsibilities. Overall, each of the six interviewees seemed focused on the idea 
that state officials had ignored what was happening with regards to public health in Flint, 
focusing instead on the financial situation of the city and only conducting public relations work 
once word spread about the lead levels in the water.  
Proposition 1b. When a higher importance is placed on cost-savings than on public 
health and safety policy, it may contribute to the formation or exacerbation of a public 
health and safety crisis.To understand the impact of the prioritization of cost-savings over 
public health and safety on the formation and exacerbation of the Flint Water Crisis, this analysis 
turns to the link between the relationships of city council members and other entities (in the form 
of bargaining over contracts, agreements, or similar interactions during city council meetings) 
with the factor groups (interests, environmental, and organizational factors) set forth in Chapter 
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II. These relationships frequently co-occur with factors in the coded meeting minutes, as it stands 
to reason that a city council member interacting with an outside entity before council is doing so 
in service of some goal or decision. Table 4 below shows the number of times a particular type 
of relationship (i.e.: a council member and a representative of a private entity, either business or 
non-profit) occurs in connection with the representation of a particular type of factor or interest. 
Table 4 
Connections between relationships and factor groups (Flint) 
Relationship Citizen Government Elected Official Private Entity 
Environmental Factors 1 21 2 39 
Organizational Factors 2 2 4 3 
Interests 2 6 5 4 
As shown above, there are four types of outside entities that appear before the Flint City 
Council or arise in response to a discussion of the water crisis: citizen groups, administrators of 
other governments, political figures, and private enterprises. Knowing that relationships like 
these can be powerful influences on government officials, particularly when a government is 
focused on the financial aspects of a given policy (Boyne, 1998; Kelleher & Yackee, 2009), it 
makes sense to ask how those relationships influence the policy-making process in the context of 
the water crisis, first by showing (as in Table 4) the connection between these relationships and 
the factors and interests being promoted by council members in that context.  
To do so, each interaction between a council member and an outside entity is coded, both 
for the type of outside entity, as well as the particular environmental factors that exist within that 
relationship. Of the four types of relationships city council members engage in before the body, 
it is overwhelmingly government-council and private entity-council relationships that are 
represented, both of which occur most frequently in connection with environmental factors. The 
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next step in understanding what this means is to unpack the category of environmental factors to 
understand exactly which factors the participants in these relationships are engaging in. 
Table 5 
Environmental factor co-occurrences (Flint) 
Factors Occurrences with 
Government Relationships 
Occurrences with Private 
Entity Relationships 
Information Asymmetry  0 0 
Organizational Home 1 0 
Accountability 0 2 
Power 6 10 
Local Idiosyncrasies 15 7 
Resources 21 39 
Three factors (power, local idiosyncrasies, and resources) in occurrence with two 
relationships (government and private) make up the overwhelming majority of connections 
between council relationships and factors in the context of the water crisis. There are few 
interactions with citizen relationships, and very few of these relationships involved information 
asymmetry between actors, appeared to be influenced by the organizational home of the actor in 
question, or referenced accountability of any sort. For example, the sole reference to the interests 
of the organizational home of the council member in conjunction to a relationship refers to an 
agreement with the City of Burton, categorized as an “organizational home” interest due to the 
explicit reference to the City Council making the agreement, as opposed to another branch of the 
city government. This comes on June 17, 2017 and reads as follows: 
Resolution resolving that the City of Flint, through its City Council, acknowledges and 
agrees to coordinate with the City of Burton and its agents for the disconnection and 
abandonment of the existing City of Flint water mains currently serving the City of 
Burton’s Elmwood Gardens Neighborhood at such time the Elmwood Gardens Water 
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Main Project is prepared for the conversion. [NOTE: As a result of the Flint Water Crisis, 
the City of Burton has undertaken plans for the construction of a new water main, known 
as the Elmwood Gardens Water Main Project, to service the citizens living within the 
boundaries of the City of Burton’s Elmwood Gardens Neighborhood (Dort 
Highway/Hemphill Road area)] 
Instead, some focus falls on issues of local idiosyncrasy, for example the passage of a 
resolution to give the authority to the Council’s Finance Committee to approve a six-way 
agreement between the City of Flint, the State of Michigan, the C.S. Mott Foundation, the 
Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD), the Great Lakes Water Authority (GLWA), 
and the Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA). This resolution occurred on October 12, 2015 and 
reads as follows: 
Resolution resolving that the Finance Department is authorized to process a budget 
amendment to the appropriate Water and Sewer funds to facilitate the switch back to the 
Detroit water system as soon as practicable, with specific revenue and expenditure line 
items to be provided by the Chief Financial Officer. [NOTE: The State of Michigan and 
CS. Mott Foundation have committed $6 million and $4 million dollars respectively to 
assist the City with the cost of purchasing water from the Detroit Water and Sewerage 
Department (DWSD) and its successor, the Great Lakes Water Authority (GLWA), until 
the City is able to receive water from the Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA). At this 
time the KWA reports that construction is on schedule to be completed by June 30, 2015 
[2016]. The City estimates the total cost to purchase water through DWSD will be $12 
million for nine months. The balance of $2 million not covered by the pledges of State 
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and Local resources is the responsibility of the City. A budget amendment is necessary to 
reflect both an increase in revenues for the receipt of $10 million in assistance and $2 
million of budgeted Use of Fund Balance, and an increase in expenditures of $12 million 
for the purchase of DWSD water supply.] 
Such an agreement is not likely to be found in other scenarios, as these actors and their 
particular institutional structures, history, and relationships are all unique to this particular area 
of Michigan. Additionally, there exists the exercise of power in the relationships noted here, 
exemplified by a non-negotiable request from the Mayor’s Office for a repayment schedule for 
the Drinking Water Revolving Fund (DWRF) from the Council. However, the primary emphasis 
is on resources, and the plurality of relationships between the council and other governments, 
along with the majority of the relationships between the council and private entities, exist to 
bargain over the allocation of resources. To further demonstrate the impact this has had over the 
course of the water crisis, quotes from individuals intimately involved in the policy process are 
laid out below: 
Money always plays a role in everything. Flint, they're not the richest city in the world, 
let's just put it that way, right? . . . But because we're typically a poorer city, let's just say. 
I think that probably had a lot to do with it. 
 
The prioritizing was money. It was all about money. It was all about what kind of money 




Unless you get these unfunded pensions dealt with and people start paying their water 
bills, you're going to have long-term financing issues, which very well could result in 
another emergency manager being put in. 
 
So it was really huge for me from a public health perspective that we stay on the Detroit 
water…and like I said, at that time, from a cost perspective, it was undoable. 
 
And then also, a lot of times, it's difficult because people always say that they want 
public health to be considered, but when you have to think about the dollars and cents 
side of things, it's very difficult to take the time to make sure that you're looking at both 
of those things. 
 
Immediately the very next pay all of the sudden we're back to paying the 120-something 
 dollars again with no credit, no anything. So, we're paying for water that we can't  use. 
This is evidence of the utility of Proposition 1b, as it is well established that the 
allocation of resources is a zero-sum game, even within the public sector (A. Dahl & Soss, 2014; 
Morgenstern & Von Neumann, 1953). If resources are not allocated in consultation with citizen 
groups, and instead are allocated to other governments or private entities, along with power not 
exercised in concert with citizens groups, then there is little evidence that citizen needs are being 
met. It must also be stated that the tone and directness used by these individuals in identifying 
these priorities was unmistakable. While this evidence points toward the utility of Proposition 
1b, further analysis of the budget of Flint must be conducted in order to demonstrate if and how 
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resources were allocated after the prioritization of these particular interests in front of the 
council.  
Proposition 1c. Once a public health and safety crisis is underway, the importance 
that municipal government places on public health and safety concerns as compared to 
cost-saving ones will vary, depending in part upon the population of the municipality. 
This sub-proposition, unlike 1a and 1b, is difficult to demonstrate without the 
comparative case, and so will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter VI. That is, to understand 
how the populations of municipalities might impact the policy response of their city councils, it 
is necessary to compare (at minimum) two cities. Chapter VI will provide such a comparison, 
albeit limited to the two cases considered herein. However, to begin to understand the dynamics 
of how municipal governments decide which policies are important, and the relationship between 
prioritization and population, Figure 8 illustrates the change over time of the conversation of the 
city council, and which interests they prioritized.  
 















The graph above indicates that in 2015, at the height of media attention on Flint, 
references to public interests dominated the debate in the city council. However, before and after 
this time, when the city and its politicians faced less scrutiny, the discussion focused on their 
own political interests. This may be indicative of two things: first, that the location of the citizens 
of Flint within the power-deservedness typology (low and less deserving) leads politicians to 
represent instead the interests of those in favor of efficient and cost-saving policies; and second, 
that pressure from citizens in the form of national media coverage, interest groups, and protests 
from activists can have an impact on the political conversation and eventual policy outcomes. 
Scholars have demonstrated that the type, manner, and direction of policy feedback is 
influenced by media coverage (Boydstun & Glazier, 2013; Breznau, 2016; Soss, 1999). 
However, to fully understand those dynamics, an understanding of social construction must serve 
as a mitigating factor, demonstrating that these results may vary significantly based on the 
construction of the population in question. As Campbell (2003) and others demonstrate, the 
power of certain populations to influence policy is variable, and so the full conclusion of this 
proposition requires the comparative nature of the analysis in Chapter VI.   
Proposition 2: The actions and/or nonactions of municipal government before and 
during a crisis will generate policy feedback effects.  
Proposition 2 and its associated sub propositions cannot be addressed entirely through the 
coding of city council minutes alone, as it inquires as to the impact of outside and external 
influences on the potential policies discussed by the council. Mettler and SoRelle (2014) provide 
an overview of what this cycle looks like, showing how payments, goods, and services along 
with rules and procedures (created by policy decisions), in turn influenced by resources and 
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interpretations, develop civic capacity and civic disposition among mass publics that leads to 
civic engagement or a lack thereof. Figure 9 below, shows this as a linear process. 
 
Figure 9. Mechanisms of policy feedback. Reproduced from “Policy feedback theory,” by S. Mettler and 
M. SoRelle, in P. A. Sabatier (Ed.) Theories of the Policy Process (3 ed., p. 165), 2014, Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press.  
The analysis of this proposition looks at the cyclical relationship between citizen 
mobilization as civic engagement and proposed future behavior of the city council in Flint. By 
analyzing interviews with stakeholders, participants, and observers of the policy process, it is 
possible to determine how each of these individuals and the agencies/interests they represent 
view the role of citizens, including activists and the media, in the policy process. Understanding 
how these citizens and their roles are viewed by the gatekeepers to that process indicates whether 
they, in the eyes of the interviewees, played or will play a significant role in changing future 
approaches to policy (Moynihan & Soss, 2014). If perceptions of citizens by those in power 
influences those citizens own conceptions of their power and deservedness, or as Campbell 
(2003) puts it, policies make citizens, then an analysis of those perceptions is the first step 
towards understanding the impact of policy feedback and social construction in the revised 
theoretical framework proposed herein. It is further proposed that those perceptions are mitigated 
and influenced by the relative power of the individual holding the perception, along with the 
bureaucratic typology that best represents them.  
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These representations of bureaucrats fit best into the interpretive effects stage of Mettler 
and SoRelle (2014). These local officials are the ones who interpret and distribute policy outside 
the council chamber, impacting how mass publics will respond and develop (or not) a civic 
predisposition leading to civic engagement. By addressing this critical stage within the broader 
policy feedback cycle, this proposition unpacks the impact of municipal leaders on feedback, and 
how citizens respond in turn. As per Figure 10 below, Proposition 2 can reconceptualized as a 
cycle, wherein each sub-proposition is related to the next. 
 
 
Figure 10. Proposition 2. 
Interviews were conducted with six individuals who work for the City of Flint, including 
in the City Clerk’s Office and the Health Department, are active in public sector labor unions in 
Flint, and who are on grant-funded projects associated with the water crisis. Their responses to 
the open-ended interview questions were coded based on a network of interrelated concepts, 
shown in the following Figure 11 network diagram. 
C. Feedback effects may be part of a causal mechanism, which establishes 
how and why municipal governments respond to public health and safety 
crises differently.
B. Mobilization and external pressures will impact the policy process, a 
dynamic mitigated in part by race, class, and other factors. 
A. Citizen mobilization will occur in some context as a response to the 




Figure 11. Atlas.ti coding network for social construction and policy feedback 
Based on this coding schema, it is shown that in the interviews, references to citizens 
mobilization occur more frequently than references to a lack of mobilization. Further, these 
references occur in interviews with egoists, glad-handers, technicians, and traditionalists. Table 
6 table below indicates the number of references to either citizen mobilization or a lack thereof 
for each of the typologies interviewed. 
Table 6 
Typologies and # of references to citizen mobilization (Flint) 
 Egoist Glad-hander Technician Traditionalist 
Citizen mobilization 5 7 8 3 
Lack of citizen mobilization 0 0 1 2 
 
Interestingly, only technicians and traditionalists referred to a lack of citizen 
mobilization in their interviews, which leads to several further questions: First, are these 
bureaucratic identities in any way associated with perceptions of citizen mobilization, and are 
they more likely to support such actions; Second, does this pattern occur in other crises; And 
third, is this mobilization and related perceptions by administrators associated with media 
72 
 
coverage of the crisis, and does the bureaucratic identity of the administrator in question play any 
role in that association?  
While this single case study cannot provide a definitive answer, it does indicate that 
citizen mobilization in response to actions and nonactions by municipal government officials 
occurred during this crisis. Below are several examples of how interviewees referred to citizen 
mobilization or the lack thereof, with the relevant passages highlighted: 
We do some campaigns for–depending on if the governors being elected and that kind 
 of thing–we get involved at a local level to get petition signatures and that kind of thing. 
 I’ve had several interactions with local community leaders that sort of lead a grassroots 
 effort and actually started an organization in response to the water crisis. 
 
And it was just really heartbreaking, her story was really heartbreaking. And yet, I really 
 appreciate somebody that maybe really was never–maybe had never really been 
 activated, if that makes sense, before to participate in the political process. But she 
 became involved and now she’s been on panels all over the state, she’s been in DC. 
 
Also, making sure that we are doing whatever we can to inspire activism. We know that it 
 was activism and the voice of residents that brought [to] light the environmental justice of 
 the water crisis here in Flint. 
Based on these preliminary findings, future research should address several key points 
elucidated here. First, the role of media influence on the policy process must be explored to a 
greater extent, in particular how the timing of national media attention can influence local policy 
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process and outcomes. Second, activism (both locally and nationally) must be recognized as a 
meaningful driver of policy feedback and studied not only through an ethnographic or 
sociological lens, but as a determinative factor that can push decision-making in certain 
directions. The role of activists and interest groups should not be understated, particularly in an 
open and accessible forum like a city council. Finally, the relationship between bureaucratic 
typologies and policy choices should be explored further, including both how those categories 
influence the decision-making of bureaucrats, as well as how and why bureaucrats develop these 
identities, and whether it is purposeful or not. 
Turning to the influence of race and class on this mobilization and the perception of 
government officials, each type of bureaucrat interviewed used language and phrases that 
indicate the social construction of the citizens being referred to. Table 7 shows the number of 
references to three types of social constructions: race, class, and other (which includes any other 
characteristic including age, use of public benefits, or gender) by bureaucratic typology, and 
following are several quotes, with the relevant sections highlighted, that indicate the socially-
constructed language used to discuss citizens. 
Table 7 
Typologies and number of references to social constructions (Flint) 
Social Construction Egoist Glad-hander Technician Traditionalist 
Class 2 4 3 1 
Race 1 3 0 5 
Other 2 5 4 5 
 
And these are folks that can't necessarily go to the store and just continually buy water 




Well, how do we know that this just isn't because of the fact that they were poor before 
 and didn't have access to nutrition services because there's nothing but corner stores and 
 liquor stores in Flint? 
 
And it's not like they don't deserve the water or need the water, but you're talking about 
 the most fragile of students. . . . well, the bottom line, there's a lot of kids coming into the 
 system now that are high behavior issues, lower IQ. 
 
Both of their final reports said that this was an environmental injustice and that race 
 played a role. And these weren't just a bunch of Democrats 
 
The race issue, our meetings now, that's all they talk about. It's the race. When the 
 election was going on, the Mayor, our current mayor, she fed on that. Said that, "The 
 only reason they did the recall is because I'm a black woman." 
Based on the previous two tables and associated quotations from the interview 
transcripts, it can be demonstrated that in the case of the Flint water crisis, (a) local officials and 
community leaders believe that citizen mobilization does occur, and (b) that race, class, and 
other factors are fundamental to how local government officials and those who work for and with 
them talk about the citizens they serve. However, the question remains as to whether the policy 
feedback provided by this mobilization, mitigated in part by the social constructions of these 
citizens, has any impact on how policy is created, and which interests are prioritized.  
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Recognizing the inherent unreliability of a single case, it can be demonstrated via Table 8 
below that the typologies that use socially-constructed language more often in their interviews 
also have views that reflect cost-saving concerns as either a priority of city government and/or as 
a cause of the Flint water crisis. Although this should not be construed to mean that there is a 
definitive connection between being identified as a glad-hander or a traditionalist, the use of 
socially-constructed language, and the priorities or causes of all crises, it does demonstrate the 
noteworthy relationship between these elements in the context of the Flint water crisis.  
Table 8 
Typologies, social constructions, and cost-saving concerns (Flint) 
Reference Egoist Glad-hander Technician Traditionalist 
Cost-saving concerns (prioritized) 2 4 3 4 
Cost-saving concerns (causal) 3 11 5 4 
Social constructions 5 12 7 11 
 
In summation, while it is clear that mobilization of citizens did occur in Flint, and that 
race, class, and other social constructions were relevant to the interpretation of that mobilization 
by local officials, there remains the question of whether or not a causal mechanism exists that 
can help explain how and why municipal governments respond to public health and safety crises 
differently. The nature of the question suggests it will require a comparative case, and for this 
reason it will be explored in Chapter VI, within the context of both the Flint and Manchester 
cases, with an eye towards determining how these two cases might be used to discern specific 
factors and causes that differ between them.  
Chapter V address the case study of Manchester, New Hampshire, and how that city has 
handled the opioid crisis. While this is a different issue, the opioid crisis has similar attributes to 
the water crisis in that it has impacted the whole city, put significant strain on resources and 
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administrators, and it has been the focus of intense media scrutiny and city council activity. 
Using the same framework and propositions, I turn now to exploring the opioid crisis before 
proceeding to a comparative analysis of these two cases.  
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Chapter V: Manchester, New Hampshire  
Manchester, New Hampshire is a classic New England city with red brick mills standing 
along the banks of the Merrimack River and a near-constant icy wind whipping between the 
Victorian homes of the 19th century industrialists, long since converted into multifamily housing 
for the descendants of Irish millworkers. Like Flint, this was once a thriving hub of industry, and 
though the fortunes of Manchester have certainly increased in ways that Flint’s have not, the 
differences between the two cities are, in part, developed out of the similarities they once shared. 
Where Flint has abandoned factories, collapsing from the inside with beams poking out like 
bones, Manchester has the revitalized Millyard District, featuring tech companies like Texas 
Instruments and DEKA Research and Development Corporation (creators of the Segway). Where 
Flint has empty lots, detritus, and blight, Manchester has parks named after Revolutionary War 
heroes and a new Riverwalk along the Merrimack. But, lurking in the grass of those green spaces 
is evidence of the public health crisis in Manchester–hypodermic needles, empty pill bottles, 
spoons, baggies, vials, tinfoil–the telltale waste products of opioid use. Between 2010 and 2015, 
New Hampshire had the largest increase per capita in opioid-involved deaths of any state, and as 
its largest city, Manchester has suffered the brunt of that increase (Leins, 2017; Rose A.  Rudd, 
Seth, David, & Scholl, 2016).  
The story of how opioids took a stranglehold on Manchester, and more broadly in the 
United States, remains nonlinear and a causal factor has been difficult to pin down. While over-
prescription of pain medication is part of the answer, so too is the smuggling of cheap heroin 
through ports of entry, at both the northern and southern border. Increasingly, these pathways are 
supplemented, and in some cases replaced, by the import of fentanyl, carfentanil, and other 
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synthetic opioids shipped from China and elsewhere. Between 2013 and 2014, the first year 
considered in this case study, opioid overdose deaths in New Hampshire rose by 73.5%, 
surpassed only by North Dakota, where total deaths were nearly 8 times fewer than in New 
Hampshire (Rose A Rudd, Aleshire, Zibbell, & Matthew Gladden, 2016; Sudders, 2015).   
In 2016, the City of Manchester released a report titled Response to the Opioid Crisis. Put 
together by the city’s Department of Health, this report details multiple actions taken by 
Manchester’s government to address the opioid crisis, as well as to engage in mitigation and 
prevention programs to further benefit the populations most impacted. The report also contains 
evidence of the successes of some programs, including statistics on prevention, intervention, 
treatment, recovery, and integration. This includes conducting presentations to hundreds of 
citizens and distributing thousands of informational resource cards, fielding nearly 1000 visits to 
Safe Stations (fire stations where citizens can surrender drugs without penalty and request 
services), and investments of millions of dollars along with a massive expansion of bed space at 
local recovery centers and shelters.  
According to the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services and 
American Medical Response, the primary provider of ambulance services and emergency 
healthcare in Manchester, opioid overdose deaths declined 18% from 2016 to 2017, even while 
total overdoses increased by 11% (American medical response: Opioid crisis fact sheet, 2017). 
This suggests that while opioids remained a significant problem in Manchester through 2017, the 
changes and investment by the city into this issue have had some impact. This chapter, beginning 
with the mini ethnographies, engages with this case through observations, interviews, visual 
representations, and an extensive review of the Board of Aldermen meeting minutes. Utilizing 
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the same methodology and structure as the Flint case, this chapter explores how Manchester, a 
fundamentally different city, has responded to a problem similar not in terms of the matter at 
hand, but in its impact on the population. 
The Manchester case is crucial to understanding the differences inherent in the local 
bureaucratic response to a crisis, and the factors that may contribute to them. First, Manchester, 
while suffering the effects of a long-term economic downturn was not under any specific 
financial constraints or austerity measures, lead to a focus among local politicians and 
bureaucrats on policy measures more closely related to public health and safety. Second, the City 
of Manchester serves a less diverse and wealthier population compared to Flint, which is also 
socially constructed by those in authority but with expectedly different results. Third, the 
Manchester case supports the framework of bureaucratic politics as proposed and provides a 
substantive second case study on crisis response in local government that can be applied to the 
expansion and improvement of the model. 
Mini-Ethnography: Manchester 
We actually had an incident where one of our emergency rooms was totally taken out of 
commission because they had five Carfentanil [a synthetic opioid] cases come in at 
once–three in the back of a pickup truck and while doing CPR on two of them, someone 
else overdosed in the bathroom at the same time, and literally shut the emergency room 
down. Public health official, Manchester. 
April 17, 2018: 5:45 p.m. The drive to Manchester from outside of Boston traces the 
Merrimack, 93 North swinging east as the river swings west. The traffic clears out quickly over 
the border into New Hampshire, long stretches of gray asphalt punctuated by exit signs for towns 
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straight out of Lovecraft or King: Andover, Ballardvale, Derry, Salem. It’s not deserted, exactly, 
but southern New Hampshire certainly feels more like rural Virginia or western Pennsylvania 
than a commuter suburb of Boston. The trees arch over the highway, and for nearly an hour as 
the sun sets, the light peeks through the branches, highlighting the rain flicking off the 
windshield. Pulling off the highway into Manchester, the red brick mills announce the city, laid 
out along the Merrimack and glinting in the sunset. On closer inspection, the signs across their 
facades proclaim in clean, sans-serif font the names of technology start-ups: Dyn, Geneia, 
snhu.edu. Past the mills, the off-ramp widens into a two-lane road leading into downtown. At 
each stoplight on the way into town, there’s at least one panhandler in the median. 
April 17, 2018: 6:27 p.m. Dressed in black ball caps and red shirts proclaiming their 
membership in the Manchester Fire Department and Local 856 of the International Association 
of Fire Fighters, a group of at least 50 men march in a circle outside of Manchester City Hall, a 
building that at first glance appears to be a Gothic church. The men are marching (but not 
singing or chanting) and more than a few step off the line to chat to friends or family, most of 
whom stay for just a few minutes before retreating to the safety of their warm vehicles. It’s cold 
for April, even in New Hampshire and it’s clear that enthusiasm among the union brotherhood is 
waning. A megaphone squeals feedback, a voice proclaims, “FAIR CONTRACT,” and the 
assembled group lets out a mildly enthusiastic cheer. The firefighters have been picketing for a 
new contract for weeks now, in protest of the city failing to give the fire department the same 3% 
raise given to the police department. Two mayors, Republican Ted Gastas, and the recently 
elected Democrat Joyce Craig, have both been unwilling to budge on the issue. While opioid 
overdoses, the recent debate over the carrying of Narcan by first responders, and the rise in 
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property crime that many in Manchester attribute to the opioid crisis, are not referenced 
explicitly by the marchers, it’s hard to imagine that these issues don’t contribute to the requests 
for a new contract, including the request for increased hazard pay.  
April 17, 2018: 7:30 p.m. Entering the Aldermanic Chambers on the third floor of City 
Hall in Manchester, the first thing I notice is how similar it looks to a traffic court. Benches, 
gates, and daises of dark but cheap-looking wood are laid out symmetrically throughout the high-
ceilinged room. A balcony overhead provides overflow seating, although tonight it seems that we 
can all be contained on the first level. With no windows, large overhead fluorescents provide the 
only light, a harsh glare that reflects off the glossy finishes. 12 men and 2 women, all White, and 
most with Irish and Italian last names, file into the chamber, many of them stopping to greet 
observers or each other. The Aldermen settle into their seats, then stand up (along with the room) 
as a group of school-age students from the Manchester Program for the Deaf and Hard of 
Hearing sign the National Anthem. The meeting is called to order, announcements are made, and 
a discussion begins concerning the budget of the city. Alderman At Large Levasseur interrupts 
the mayor to note a minor objection to the readjustment of severance funding for city employees. 
As the meeting proceeds, this scene is repeated several times. From the facial reactions of the 
other Aldermen, it would seem that the board is familiar with the negotiation style of the 
Alderman At Large. 
April 18, 2018: 1:30 p.m. On the way to meet an interviewee, I pass a sign just outside 
of Manchester that declares itself in red bubble letters–Funworld, and below that, NOW HIRING. 
Funworld, it would seem, is a large building shaped like a medieval castle. I can’t resist pulling 
into the parking lot to get a better view. Circling the lot, it feels like an abandoned building, but I 
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can see cars parked in the lot and can hear faint music coming from within. As I turn my car 
around, I spot a homeless encampment, just outside the chain-link fence that surrounds the 
complex. Beer cans, plastic bags, and the remains of what looks like a small shelter built out of 
tarps and boxes spill down a small incline. Driving back out the front entrance, I see a small 
army of schoolchildren waiting in the rain with their chaperones to enter the castle. Nobody 
seems to be having much fun. When I meet up with my next interviewee, I ask her about it. “Oh, 
that’s Funworld” she says, in a thick New Hampshire accent, and doesn’t elaborate further.  
In similar fashion to the Flint case, in Figure 12 below are a number of images taken in 
the greater Manchester area during my visit. As indicated in Chapter IV, the intention with these 
and the vignettes described on the previous page is to capture specific moments, bringing the 
reader along with the researcher into the process of visiting a particular place at a particular time. 
Following these photographs, I explore the specific demographic characteristics of Manchester, 
in light of what they might explain regarding the influences of social construction and policy 
feedback on the bureaucratic politics of the Board of Aldermen. The previously described formal 
propositions are repeated, this time using data from Manchester. Finally, the chapter closes with 











Figure 12. Photos taken in Manchester, New Hampshire. Clockwise from upper left on previous page: 
Aldermanic Chambers, 1 City Hall Plaza, 3rd floor; firefighter’s picket at Manchester City Hall, 1 City 
Hall Plaza; Funworld, 200 Daniel Webster Highway, Nashua, NH; poster in the Manchester Health 
Department, 1528 Elm St.; Merrimack River and former Amoskeag Manufacturing Company mills, 10 
Arms St.; photos of former mayors in the stairwell of City Hall, 1 City Hall Plaza, 1st-4th floors. All 
photographs copyright of the author.  
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Social Construction and Policy in Manchester 
Table 9 
Demographic statistics (Manchester) 
Race Estimate Percentage 
Total Population 110,065 100% 
White 94,390 85.8% 
Black or African American 5,066 4.6% 
All Other Census Categories 10,609 9.6% 
 
Employment Estimate Percentage 
In Labor Force 62,892 69.3% 
Employed 58,731 64.8% 
Unemployed 4,161 4.6% 
Not in Labor Force 27,809 30.7% 
 
Income Estimate Percentage 
Total households 44,156 100% 
Less than $10,000 2,437 5.5% 
$10,000 to $14,999 2,324 5.3% 
$15,000 to $24,999 4,521 10.2% 
$25,000 to $34,999 5,000 11.3% 
$35,000 to $49,999 5,758 13.0% 
$50,000 to $74,999 8,900 20.2% 
$75,000 to $99,999 6,436 14.6% 
$100,000 to $149,999 5,668 12.8% 
$150,000 to $199,999 1,974 4.5% 
$200,000 or more 1,138 2.6% 
 
Welfare Benefits Estimate Percentage 
With Supplemental Security Income 3,146 7.0% 
With Cash Public Assistance Income 2,063 4.6% 
With Food Stamp/SNAP Benefits 6,510 14.5% 
Note. Adapted from American Community Survey (2014). Retrieved from 
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/ 
Some of the demographic characteristics that are most relevant to understanding social 
construction of the population of Manchester, as in any city, are race, employment, income, and 
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use of public benefits. Manchester is a majority-White city, with Black or African American 
residents making up a narrow plurality of the non-White residents. Close to 10% of the 
population identifies as neither White nor Black, with most of those residents identifying as 
Asian or Hispanic/Latino. Race is a particularly salient variable when it comes to policy 
development and implementation according the literature on social construction, and therefore 
the super-majority of White residents is particularly important to understanding how bureaucratic 
politics function in Manchester (Schneider & Ingram, 1993; Schneider et al., 2014).  
Outside of race, it is also important to consider the impact of employment and income, 
and by association class, on the social constructions that may be most prevalent in Manchester. 
Close to 1/3 of the population of Manchester over the age of 16 does not participate in the labor 
force but there is a low level of unemployment, suggesting that the job market is good, and 
therefore many of those non-participants may be students, caretakers, or otherwise occupied 
outside of the workforce. While there is a wide range of incomes in Manchester, there are very 
few households that report income below $15,000 per year. The majority of earners are grouped 
within the income range of $35,000-$100,000 per year, well above the poverty line for even a 
six-person household (Destro, 2019). These two variables of race and class suggest that the 
citizens of Manchester are likely to be categorized though the lens of social construction as 
relatively deserving of “good” policy, and powerful when it comes to their political power to 
mobilize and provide meaningful feedback to policy makers.  
As previously discussed in Chapter IV, welfare policy and those who receive welfare are 
highly likely to be viewed through this lens of social construction. In Manchester, very few 
residents use three common public assistance programs: SNAP (food stamps), Supplemental 
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Security Income, and cash public assistance. The literature on social construction would 
therefore suggest that in Manchester, the social construction of welfare is unlikely to have a 
significant impact on the bureaucratic politics of the Board of Aldermen, or on how policy is 
conceived and perceived within that city (Campbell, 2003; Riccucci, 2005; Soss, 1999; Soss & 
Schram, 2007; Watkins-Hayes, 2009b).  
It is fair to say that in Manchester, the Board and mayor have a meaningful amount of 
power that allows them to shape policy within the city. The delegation of power to this group 
suggests some amount of trust in their ability to execute the process of creating and 
implementing policy, although just as any other decision-making body must, they are forced to 
bargain and negotiate with other entities, both within and outside government (Halperin & 
Clapp, 1974; Meier, 1987; Rourke, 1969). Just as in Flint, I turn to the discourse around the crisis 
in this city, opioid overdoses, to analyze the propositions laid out in Chapter I.  
Proposition 1: Municipal governments prioritize policies that focus on cost-saving 
measures. 
Proposition 1a. During the policy creation process, the individuals at the bargaining 
table prioritize parochial, political, and agency-specific interests over broader public 
interests, including health and safety. 
An analysis of the Board of Aldermen meeting minutes demonstrates the various interests 
represented in front of that body, and which are prioritized over others, as seen below in Figure 
13. For instance, in an invited presentation to the Board, the chief of police stated: 
The way it works is the money is dedicated to certain initiatives, however, the initiatives 
that we are going to be funding like Operate Cayenne, Granite Hammer and some of our 
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other drug initiatives will all come out of that. Last year, we used the money from the 
vacancies that we had. Once we filled those vacancies if you recall I came to this board 
and said we have to stop doing what we are doing. The board said they would cover me if 
there was any overage in our budget, which you did, and I appreciate that. The board has 
been very supportive. You also gave us another $100,000 if you remember. 
This statement, and the interactions preceding and following, are coded as agency 
interests, as the individual is clearly advocating for funding for his agency, and the board is 
clearly supportive of that request. Conversely, a report on a broad, multi-agency coalition 
developing educational materials about prescription drugs and home security is coded as civic 
duty and problem solving, as instead of requesting resources for a particular agency, it 
demonstrates an attentiveness to the needs of individuals, and corresponds to interview data 
suggesting that this is what the citizens of Manchester want. Out of a total of 112 coded interests, 
Figure 13 below represents the percentage of references to each interest. As in the Flint case, this 
choice to represent references to interests as percentages of a whole is done to better facilitate 




Figure 13. Representation of interests by % (Manchester). 
As in the previous chapter, to provide a more concise analysis of which categories of 
interests are represented most often, these subcategories are redefined into four themes: council 
politics (area rewards and electoral interests), self-interest (personal and agency), efficiency 
(managerial and temporary), and public good (civic duty and problem solving). Self-interested 
concerns occur a majority of the time (nearly 55%) relative to the other thematic streams, 
followed by public concerns (~36%). Political concerns are noted just over 6% of the time, while 
efficiency concerns are only noted just over 3% of the time. In particular, many of these concerns 
thematically centered on the police department, and how law enforcement was dealing with the 





















Figure 14. Representation of interest themes by % (Manchester). 
These findings suggest that public interests are represented to a significant extent in front 
of the Board, but that it is self-interested concerns (primarily the interests of police officials or 
other law enforcement personnel) that takes up the majority of the time spent discussing the 
opioid crisis. This is echoed in some of the open-ended discussions with interviewees who work 
for or closely with the board, various city departments, state government, and local non-profits. 
Respondents were asked to tell the interviewer about a time they felt that certain interests (of any 
type) were prioritized over others in front of the Board. Following are selected quotes on the 
subject, with the relevant evidence that suggests the prioritization of certain interests highlighted 
in yellow.  
And for the most part, I'd have to say the Aldermen are extremely supportive of what we 








Self-Interest Public Council Politics Efficiency
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 relationship and they call us when they have some issues that are going on in the 
 community to help them understand or deal with. 
 
They not only have priorities that surround community health issues, but they're 
 balancing budgets and they have school budgets and potholes to take care of and all that. 
 And so, they're balancing a set of priorities that's different than the set of priorities, I 
 think, that we have. 
 
One [priority] is to reduce the current pool of users, and you're going to do that from a 
 law enforcement perspective and from things like the PDMP [prescription drug 
 monitoring program], making sure there are fewer drugs…so helping those that are 
 currently addicted, reducing that pool. Getting the drugs off the street, getting people 
 help, getting people treatment. 
 
But when the public issues come up like the opioid epidemic, people in this state are 
 savvy enough to know what position they're going to take on it, and the take is going to 
 be we're going to do something.  
As these selected quotations imply, many of the interviewees found that their priorities 
overlapped or were explicitly supported by the Board. For several non-profits dealing with the 
opioid crisis, this meant that the Board supported them both financially and politically, and they 
did not see private interests or other levels of government interfering with that support. All seven 
of the interviewees believed, at least to some extent, that the Board of Aldermen was in support 
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of their agency or organization and did not see the Board as unhelpful or deleterious regarding 
opioid overdoses in the city. 
Proposition 1b. When a higher importance is placed on cost-saving policy than on 
public health and safety policy, it may contribute to the formation or exacerbation of a 
public health and safety crisis.To understand how the priorities set forward in the previous 
proposition impact the formation and exacerbation of the opioid crisis in Manchester, I look at 
the connection between the relationships of Board members and other entities (in the form of 
discussions regarding contracts, agreements, or similar interactions during Board of Aldermen 
meetings) with the factor groups (interests, environmental, and organizational factors) set forth in 
Chapter II, the same method that was conducted for the Flint case. As stated previously, these 
relationships frequently co-occur with factors in the coded meeting minutes, and it is likely that a 
member of the Board of Aldermen would only be interacting with an outside entity before the 
Board in service of some particular priority. Table 10 below shows the number of times a type of 
relationship (i.e.: A Board member and a citizen) occurs in connection with a factor or interest. 
Table 10 
Connections between relationships and factor groups (Manchester) 
Relationship Citizen Government Elected Official Private Entity 
Environmental Factors 0 14 1 12 
Organizational Factors 0 6 1 5 
Interests 6 9 1 19 
Using the same methodology as in the Flint case, an analysis is conducted on the public 
interactions between the Board and four groups: citizens, administrators of other governments, 
political figures, and private enterprises. As in the Flint case, it is likely that relationships like 
these can have meaningful influences on Board members (Boyne, 1998; Kelleher & Yackee, 
2009). Relationships between Board members and either government officials or private entities 
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were most common. Table 11 shows the occurrences of government-Board relationships among 
environmental factors, while Table 12 does the same for both environmental factors and interests 
in connection with private entity-Board relationships  
Table 11 
Environmental factor co-occurrences (Manchester) 
Factor Occurrences with Government Relationship 
Information asymmetry 1 
Organizational Home 2 
Accountability 2 
Power 0 




Interest and environmental factor co-occurrences (Manchester) 
Interest Occurrences with Private Entity Relationship 
Agency 4 
Area Rewards 0 




Problem Solving 2 
Temporary 0 
Factor  
Information Asymmetry  1 
Organizational Home 0 
Accountability 1 
Power 0 
Local Idiosyncrasies 0 
Resources 11 
While relationships are coded for multiple interests or factors, the majority of 
government-board interactions occur in the context of a discussion of resources, while private 
entity-board interactions co-occur with a discussion of resources or personal interests. Examples 
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of government-board relationships co-occurring with discussions of resources include multiple 
discussions on how potential grant funding from the state government would be distributed 
within the city. Below, Alderman Levasseur asks for a clarification from the Director of the 
Health Department: 
I would like to ask Mr. Soucy a question. Can you tell us and explain a little bit if you can 
 what the benefits are of this grant and what you as the Health Director . . . are you able to 
 provide any services directly for the citizens of the city of Manchester for these drug 
 related issues and does any of the money you get go to the Fire Department for the 
 purchase of Narcan? 
The connections between private entity relationships and personal interests are primarily 
through the relating of stories by Aldermen that recount specific interactions they have had with 
people in the community impacted by the opioid crisis. This co-occurrence is exemplified in the 
following statement from Alderman O’Neil: 
We have a major issue in the City of Manchester. I don’t think there is a person in here 
 that isn’t aware of somebody that was touched by heroin or other drug issues. The people 
 of Manchester want us to do something about it. They don’t want to hear well we are 
 waiting on the county delegation to do it. They want us to do something and take action. I 
 think this is a good opportunity to show the county we are serious about it. I support the 
 motion to include it. 
Repeatedly, Aldermen and others before the Board used personal experience and the 
impact of the opioid crisis on their constituents, friends, and families in support of resolutions or 
other decisions that would promote education and enforcement around the opioid crisis. Personal 
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and other “non-rational” factors influence how policy-makers conduct themselves within the 
context of bureaucratic politics, and it appears that Manchester is no exception (Allison & 
Zelikow, 1971; Brower & Abolafia, 1997; Lindblom, 1959). In interviews with multiple local 
government leaders who work in close association with the Board, a similar theme was reflected. 
With this evidence in hand, it is worth noting that self-interest in Manchester may be very 
different than self-interest in Flint, and this will be explored in the proceeding chapter. The 
following quotes illuminate perceptions of a problem that exists on a very personal level for 
many of these individuals, and the associated belief that the government has a mandate to do 
something about it. 
But the other thing is I have a friend goes back many, many years who I know is a 
 wonderful mother involved in the community and cause . . . and her son died of a drug 
 overdose, and I've just been able to watch that. 
 
He was suffering–he was a heroin user and she learned of this time when he perished, 
 and it turned about to be that he died in a drunk-driving accident. And she said “I was 
 relieved. I was relieved because he didn't die from a heroin overdose. He died in a drunk-
 driving accident. And it was much easier to tell people my son died in a drunk-driving 
 accident then to tell them my son overdosed on heroin” 
 
We had had a series of meetings . . . the impetus of those were that the mayor at the time 
 received a call from actually someone who was a friend of his whose son had overdosed 




They have an executive director who's openly in recovery. He wanted to get into 
 substance use treatment, so they built a big infrastructure on it. That doesn't make sense. 
 Well, that's the way New Hampshire works. 
 
And I remember getting up in front of the board at Mayor and Aldermen and really 
 pleading with them that "We had 100 people die last year and we're talking about poor 
 parking spaces." There’s times when you have to forget the rules, forget the zones, forget 
 all those things that we decide [when] you live [in] an organized community. 
The preceding evidence suggests that, in Manchester, only part of Proposition 1b is 
demonstrated. While it is true that public concerns are not prioritized, there is no clear evidence 
to say that cost-saving concerns are prioritized above any other interests in particular. In fact, 
when the specific interests and concerns that are prioritized are analyzed at a granular level and 
supplemented with feedback from individuals close to the process, it becomes clear that in 
Manchester, personal experience and the close proximity of the issue to the individuals making 
policy has a significant impact on how decisions are made. This may well be related to the 
phenomenon of policy visibility and proximity described by Soss and Schram (2007), who posit 
that citizens who are more proximate to a given issue or policy are more likely to push for action 
on that issue. To fully understand the utility of Proposition 1b, an analysis of the budget of 
Manchester between 2013-2017 could prove useful in unpacking how specific economic 
concerns were or were not acted upon. 
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Proposition 1c. Once a public health and safety crisis is underway, the importance 
that municipal government places on public health and safety concerns as compared to 
cost-saving ones will vary, depending in part upon the population of the municipality.As in 
the previous case, the evidence for the utility of this proposition will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter VI. In similar fashion, however, Figure 15 below will help to demonstrate how the 
government of Manchester adapted their priorities over time, determining which policies were 
important. These findings, when taken in context with those of Flint and the respective 
populations of the two cities, provides insight into how and why local governments choose to 
shift their priorities over time. 
 
Figure 15. Number of references per year by interest type (Manchester, 2013-2017). 
In Manchester, self-interest, as described previously, dominates the conversation and 
discussion in front of the Board over the period analyzed here. Public interests are represented 
too, but even as the conversation expands in 2015 and 2016, the priority of self-interests remains. 
















proximal and visible relationship between opioid-related policies and the Board of Aldermen in 
Manchester. If, in fact, these Board members have close working relationships with the public as 
the stories and quotes in response to Proposition 1b have shown, then it follows that they will see 
the citizens of Manchester as more powerful and deserving within the associated framework 
(Schneider et al., 2014; Soss & Schram, 2007). 
Further, evidence from interviews shows that many of the community leaders outside and 
inside of city government have good working relationships with the Board and with government 
leadership, and so while it is entirely possible that increased media coverage and awareness of 
the crisis pushed the conversation onto the agenda of the Board, it is also possible that Aldermen 
were prioritizing this issue even prior to receiving unexpected pressure from outside groups.  
To recognize the impact of social construction, a comparative case must be made, 
demonstrating that policy outcomes may vary significantly based upon the constructions of the 
population in question. This will require more than two cases, but preliminary assessments can 
be made from the cases contained in this work. The full conclusion as to the utility of this 
proposition is reached in Chapter VI, where a relevant comparison between the two cases is 
made.  
Proposition 2: The actions and/or non-actions of municipal government before and during 
a crisis will generate policy feedback effects.  
A full discussion of the cyclical nature of policy feedback and how bureaucratic 
typologies may impact that cycle can be found in Chapter IV. For purposes of convenience, these 
figures are repeated below as figures 16 and 17, respectively, demonstrating both the cyclical 
nature of the proposition and the coding schema and network first laid out in Chapter IV. As in 
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the Flint case, the perceptions of the bureaucrats analyzed here are those of individuals who deal 
with the impact of policy outside of the Aldermanic Chambers, and thereby help shape how mass 
publics mobilize, respond, and perceive the impact of policy as well. 
 
 
Figure 16. Proposition 2.  
 
Figure 17. Atlas.ti coding network for social construction and policy feedback 
 
To demonstrate Proposition 2a, Table 13 below shows that references to citizen 
mobilization occur with greater regularity than to a lack of mobilization. This pattern persists 
C. Feedback effects may be part of a causal mechanism, which 
establishes how and why municipal governments respond to 
public health and safety crises differently.
B. Mobilization and external pressures will impact the policy 
process, a dynamic mitigated in part by race, class and other 
factors. 
A. Citizen mobilization will occur in some context as a response 




among both glad-handers and technicians, the two types of bureaucrats interviewed in 
Manchester. 
Table 13 
Typologies and number of references to citizen mobilization (Manchester) 
 Glad-hander Technician 
Citizen Mobilization 7 12 
Lack of Citizen Mobilization 3 2 
The limitations here are clear, as it is impossible to get a full picture without 
understanding how egoists, traditionalists, and followers perceive citizen mobilization. As was 
true in Flint, this case is limited by the time and resources available at this stage of the project to 
find a wide enough selection of interviewees to ensure each typology is represented. However, 
there is still relevance to using these typologies to make comparisons, although future research 
will necessitate the recruitment and analysis of interviewees who do fall into these other 
typologies. Finally, it is notable that no bureaucrats were identified as followers in Flint or 
Manchester. While it is possible this is a result of a coding bias, it may also be a result of the 
self-selection of particular individuals who consented to interviews. Glad-handers and 
technicians clearly saw citizen mobilization as more prevalent, and Chapter VI will assess these 
findings in conjunction with those in Flint. To further facilitate that comparison and the broader 
conclusions that may be drawn from it, below are references to citizen mobilization or the lack 
thereof from interviews conducted in Manchester: 
We have a tremendous amount of information to help each other but with this crisis, 





And so that group convened and Ron's on that group, representatives of two hospitals, 
 and they talked about who might serve as the lead, and there were three or four that were 
 considered, and it ended up being Catholic Medical Center stepped up and said that they 
 would do it. 
 
But what was amazing–I remember two weeks after the announcement of the 
 receivership, the new mayor convened a meeting, there must have been 60 people in the 
 room, all providers, and 95% were representatives of Network for Health member 
 partners or delivery network, and nearly all the services that have been maintained have 
 been picked up by other partners. 
 
And it's up to us to advocate for the folks that we serve to explain as best we can to the 
 community leaders around what the real cost of not providing these services might be and 
 where we would like to do more or better. 
These findings are illuminating, but as stated in Chapter IV, more value can be brought to 
them by pursuing questions of media influence on the policy process, how activism and 
mobilization can impact policy decisions, and what bureaucratic styles or typologies can tell us 
about how those decisions are made.  
Proposition 2b posits that any mobilization of citizens will be mitigated in part by the 
social constructions of race and class within the population in question. These constructions 
impact both citizen mobilization and the perception of local officials of that mobilization, and the 
following Table 14 shows how each type of bureaucrat interviewed used language and phrases 
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that indicate the social construction of the citizens being referred to. In Manchester, it is worth 
noting that “Other” social constructions often revolved around perceptions of mental health and 
addiction, categories that are particularly salient within the literature of social construction and 
this case in particular. New work has shown that opioid addicts, in particular, are seen as 
“deviants,” both less powerful and less deserving, by mass publics (Kreitzer & Watts Smith, 
2018). Following this table are several quotes, with the relevant language highlighted. 
Table 14 
Typologies and # of references to social constructions (Manchester) 
Social Construction Glad-hander Technician 
Class 6 4 
Race 0 1 
Other 11 16 
I mean, this epidemic or whatever you want to call, it really didn't take on until people 
 from all walks of life were dying. People were dying from heroin overdoses who were 
 poor and nobody cared about it, and then all of a sudden, lawyer's sons and doctor's sons, 
 people from the north end of Manchester, people that you would never think–teachers 
 were dying from this stuff then all of a sudden we've got to do something, and that's kind 
 of the way America is I believe. 
 
And as a provider, you don't have a lot of job satisfaction when you have somebody you 
 just keep putting more time into and more time into and they're not improving, but maybe 
 they're not improving because of the chaos they have at home, the unsafe place they're 





We will still do business the way that we do but rather than terminate these people when 
we initially discover that they have a substance-use disorder, how do we find them 
treatment and how do we have them be more effective? 
 
We have to wear ballistic vests and those kinds of things because generally, those calls 
 [mental health or substance related] have a higher risk. 
In Manchester, there is clearly a perception among local officials that citizens are 
mobilized around this issue, particularly with the help of and in collaboration with non-profits, 
government officials, and other community leaders. In addition, bureaucrats’ views of citizens 
are socially constructed, but the impact of that construction is somewhat unclear. While research 
suggests that opioid addicts are seen as both low-power and low-deservedness, the evidence 
presented here and in Proposition 1 points toward a characterization of the opioid crisis as both 
proximal and visible to the policymakers of Manchester (Kreitzer & Watts Smith, 2018; Soss & 
Schram, 2007). So, both Proposition 2a and 2b would appear to be confirmed, although to 
ambiguous degrees. There are clearly, elements of citizen mobilization present in Manchester, 
but the impact of social construction on that mobilization and the direction of that impact 
requires further scrutiny. Future work should explore how the social construction of opioid 
addicts in a proximal and visible policy environment may change, or how policymakers may 
change their social constructions of certain groups based on the policy environment in which 
they find themselves.  
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With only two typologies of bureaucrat to compare, it is difficult to make a clear 
association between the social construction of populations and the priority of cost-saving 
concerns among bureaucrats in Manchester. Table 15 below shows that both typologies 
represented in the Manchester interviews used socially constructed language frequently and do 
consider cost-saving concerns as priority of the Board of Aldermen and/or as a causal factor in 
the opioid epidemic. Again, there is no definitive link between the identities of glad-hander or a 
technician and the likelihood of holding these views, although the comparative case put forward 
in Chapter VI will discuss further the commonalities between Flint and Manchester in this 
analysis. Finally, even without a definitive causal connection, there is a thematic connection 
made by bureaucrats between cost-saving concerns and the social construction of populations, 
This connection must be explored further, both in this case and in future cases, as it may lead to 
the development of a causal mechanism determined by economic factors. 
Table 15 
Typologies, social constructions, and cost-saving concerns (Manchester) 
References Glad-hander Technician 
Cost-Saving Concerns (prioritized) 6 8 
Cost-Saving Concerns (causal) 11 9 
Social Constructions 17 21 
Citizens were mobilized by the opioid crisis in Manchester, and that mobilization did not 
go unnoticed by local officials dealing with the crisis. Their perceptions, and in particular their 
social constructions of mental health and addiction, combined with the proximal and visible 
nature of the problem, led to a collaboration between citizens and local officials unlike what 
occurred in Flint. To understand if there is a causal connection between that collaboration and 
the policy outcomes in Manchester, a comparative case is set forth in Chapter VI. While these 
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two cases alone may not provide all the answers, there is a particular need to determine how 
future cases might be explored in different ways, or how the propositions proposed herein might 
be altered.  
The next chapter contains a comparative look at the cases of the water quality crisis in 
Flint, Michigan, and the opioid crisis in Manchester, New Hampshire. While the issues 
considered in these separate case studies are different, as crises of public health they contain 
commonalities and the relevant findings from both are important in demonstrating the utility of 
the model and propositions contained here. By comparing the two cities and how different public 
health and safety crises were handled, insight into how other cities handle similar crises may be 
elucidated, along with information that will help revise and refine both the model and 





Chapter VI: Cross-Case Analysis and Major Findings 
There is much to be learned in observing how different jurisdictions, with different 
priorities and actors, respond to crises of public health and safety. Any comparison is rightfully 
constrained by the meaningful differences between the cities, as well as the substantive 
differences in the crises they face. Given that this work intends to open new research pathways 
that consider the utility of an adapted theory of bureaucratic politics for local government, along 
with a framework for assessing the politics of crisis in American cities, the comparative case 
proves useful primarily in demonstrating that commonalities exist.   
First, the figures below lay out a comparison of the cities demographically and 
socioeconomically. Next, a review of the evidence for Propositions 1c and 2c, both of which 
require a comparative case to demonstrate, is conducted. A comparison of the findings for 
Propositions 1a-b and 2a-b follows. Finally, results from both cases are assessed regarding their 
relationship to the four primary considerations proposed in Chapter II.  
According to the U.S Census, the population (measured by either individuals or 
households) in Flint and Manchester is relatively similar. As previously discussed, both cities 
have a history of heavy industry and rapid economic growth, as well as more recent economic 
difficulties. Outside of this, however, the makeup of each city is very distinct. The population in 
Flint is majority-Black, while in Manchester it is a super-majority-White. Manchester has much 
lower rates of unemployment, as well as higher rates of participation in the labor force. Both 
cities have many low-income residents, but 22% of Flint’s residents make below $12,490 per 
year, which is below the poverty line even for a household of a single person. Finally, Flint has a 
significantly higher percentage of residents who utilize public benefits, a meaningful statistic 
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when considering the social construction of populations (Soss & Schram, 2007). The tables and 
figures below show the similarities and differences along demographic and socioeconomic lines 
in Flint and Manchester. 
Table 16 
Comparative demographic statistics 
 Flint Estimates Manchester Estimates 
Race     
Total Population 100,569 100% 110,065 100% 
White 42,826 42.6% 94,390 85.8% 
African American 58,307 58.0% 5,066 4.6% 
All Other Census Categories 3,743 3.8% 10,609 9.6% 
     
Employment     
In Labor Force 38,862 50.3% 62,892 69.3% 
Employed 28,618 37.0% 58,731 64.8% 
Unemployed 10,227 13.2% 4,161 4.6% 
Not in Labor Force 38,451 49.7% 27,809 30.7% 
     
Income     
Total Households 40,509 100% 44,156 100% 
Less than $10,000 8,985 22.2% 2,437 5.5% 
$10,000 to $14,999 4,040 10.0% 2,324 5.3% 
$15,000 to $24,999 7,459 18.4% 4,521 10.2% 
$25,000 to $34,999 5,312 13.1% 5,000 11.3% 
$35,000 to $49,999 5,522 13.6% 5,758 13.0% 
$50,000 to $74,999 5,329 13.2% 8,900 20.2% 
$75,000 to $99,999 1,987 4.9% 6,436 14.6% 
$100,000 to $149,999 1,428 3.5% 5,668 12.8% 
$150,000 to $199,999 276 0.7% 1,974 4.5% 
$200,000 or more 171 0.4% 1,138 2.6% 
     
Public Benefits     
With Supplemental Security Income 5,882 14.5% 3,146 7.0% 
With Cash Public Assistance Income 4,729 11.7% 2,063 4.6% 
With Food Stamp/SNAP Benefits 17,455 43.1% 6,510 14.5% 





Figure 18. Race in Flint and Manchester. 
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Figure 20. Income in Flint and Manchester. 
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Proposition 1c. Once a public health and safety crisis is underway, the importance 
that municipal government places on public health and safety concerns as compared to 
cost-saving ones will vary, depending in part upon the population of the municipality. 
To demonstrate Proposition 1c, it is necessary to compare at least two cities to understand 
how cost-saving interests are prioritized over other interests, and how the social construction of 
those impacted may be part of the reason for such a prioritization. As previously demonstrated in 
Chapters IV and V, the figures below show the change in interests over time, as represented 
before the Flint City Council and Manchester Board of Aldermen, respectively. In Flint, 
political, efficiency and public interests were much more prevalent than in Manchester, where 
self-interests dominated the discussion. Cost-saving concerns, as represented in the category of 
efficiency, were well-represented over the course of the dates considered in Flint. Both cities had 
more references to their respective crises in 2015, and this may be attributed to the additional 
media and public attention focused on them at that time (Boydstun & Glazier, 2013; Breznau, 
2016; Soss, 1999). 
In fact, the self-interest in Manchester is perhaps better characterized as a community 
orientation. This focus in Manchester, as described in Chapter V, is likely based both in the 
particular social constructions of opioid addicts and the personal connection that many 
community leaders in Manchester have to those individuals. Such connections lead to opioid 
addiction becoming a more proximal and visible issue, and therefore may have influenced the 
perception of opioid addicts among policymakers in Manchester (Kreitzer & Watts Smith, 2018; 
Schneider et al., 2014; Soss & Schram, 2007). References to self-interests, or with a community 
orientation, appeared before the Board considerably more often than references to any particular 
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cost-saving interests, and this indicates that there are differences between Flint and Manchester 
as pertaining to the types of interests that receive a hearing before the local government 
legislature. 
 
Figure 22. Number of references per year by interest type (Flint). 
 
Figure 23. Number of references per year by interest type (Manchester). 



























is the social construction of the respective populations that contributes to the changing interests 
over time in these cities, there is certainly enough evidence to call for further inquiry into this 
proposition. The first part of the proposition, that interests will shift in priority as a crisis goes 
on, is clearly demonstrated, with the caveat that the interests that tend to dominate the discussion 
in front of local government continue to do so. To demonstrate the second part, more case 
studies, as well as further exploration of demographic data and policy outcomes (i.e. cleaner 
water in Flint or fewer overdoses in Manchester) will be needed to determine whether this 
proposition is a useful measure of the impact of social construction on the interests represented 
before local governments during a crisis. However based on the literature, the social construction 
of populations has an impact on the policy they receive and the expected difference between the 
two cities is clearly demonstrated: local officials in Manchester, a whiter and wealthier city, 
respond to social constructions very differently than those in Flint (Campbell, 2003; Kreitzer & 
Watts Smith, 2018; Schneider & Ingram, 1993; Schneider et al., 2014).  
Proposition 2c. These feedback effects may be part of a causal mechanism, which 
establishes how and why municipal governments respond to public health and safety crises 
differently. 
In order to begin the work of developing potential casual mechanisms that may be present 
and drive the ways in which bureaucratic politics is conducted in the local government setting, 
the first step is to look at the specific individuals who are engaged in those politics, and identify 
how their individual positions, power, and approaches may contribute to creating those 
mechanisms. As in Chapters V and VI, I turn here to an analysis of the bureaucratic typologies of 
individuals who sat for interviews, to understand how and when they socially construct the 
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populations they serve. Since, as previously demonstrated, citizen mobilization occurs and its 
impact is influenced in some part by the social constructions of that population by these local 
officials, the first step towards understanding the cause of the differences between the cities may 
lie in the responses of these actors, and how it relates to the populations they serve. 
Table 17 
Typologies, social constructions, and cost-saving concerns 
Flint Glad-hander Technician Egoist Traditionalist 
Cost-Saving Concerns (Prioritized) 4 3 2 4 
Cost-Saving Concerns (Casual) 11 5 3 4 
Social Constructions 12 7 5 11 
Manchester     
Cost-Saving Concerns (Prioritized) 6 8 - - 
Cost-Saving Concerns (Casual) 11 9 - - 
Social Constructions 17 21 - - 
 
With only two typologies of bureaucrat to accurately compare between both cities, and 
two others that occur in the Flint interviews only, it would be inadvisable to make any type of 
definitive statement regarding how these individuals are influenced by their own social 
constructions of those they serve, and if their personal attitudes and approach (as constituted in 
the typologies) are meaningful factors. As Table 17 above shows, individuals across all 
typologies and with different roles in and around government use socially constructed language 
frequently. While recognizing the limitations of two case studies, the evidence suggests that 
these individuals do see cost-saving concerns as both causal to the crisis at hand, as well as 
noting that those concerns are prioritized throughout an ongoing crisis. To better understand this 
relationship, future research should include more structured interviews to reveal those 
connections, and the link between social construction and cost-saving concerns made explicit. 
However, this important first step demonstrates that all of the typologies interviewed in both 
114 
 
cases used the language of social construction, and also saw causal cost-saving factors as well as 
the prioritization of cost-saving concerns in the context of the respective crises.   
Below, Propositions 1 and 2 are reproduced, and the results of each shown for both Flint 
and Manchester in Table 18. A “Strong” finding indicates that the sub-proposition was 
definitively demonstrated, a “Weak” finding indicates that the sub-proposition was demonstrated 
with some limitations or inconsistencies, and a “Null” finding indicates that the sub-proposition 
was not demonstrated. To be clear, this is not representative of the utility of the propositions 
themselves, as each potential finding demonstrates a different utility of the proposition for future 
research. To wit, a “Strong” finding for both cities indicates that the proposition might be 
universally demonstrable, given the significant differences between the cities considered here. A 
“Strong” in one city but “Weak” in another indicates that the proposition may be influenced in 
part by the city itself, including the bureaucratic typologies represented therein, the population of 
that city and their associated social constructions, or the overall sociodemographic makeup of the 
city. A “Weak” finding for both cities indicates that this proposition could be universally untrue. 
More case studies and future research, to be discussed further in Chapter VII, may be helpful in 
refining and expanding upon the propositions set forth here. 
1. Municipal governments prioritize policies that focus on cost-saving measures.  
a) During the policy creation process, the individuals at the bargaining table 
prioritize parochial, political, and agency-specific interests over broader public 
interests, including health and safety. 
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b) When a higher importance is placed on cost-savings policy than on public health 
and safety policy, it may contribute to the formation or exacerbation of a public 
health and safety crisis. 
c) Once a public health and safety crisis is underway, the importance that municipal 
government places on public health and safety concerns as compared to cost-
saving ones will vary, depending in part upon the population of the municipality. 
2. The actions and/or nonactions of municipal government before and during a crisis 
will generate policy feedback effects.  
a) Citizen mobilization will occur in some context as a response to the 
actions/nonactions of municipal government during a crisis.  
b) This mobilization and the external pressures that come with it will impact the 
policy process, a dynamic mitigated in part by race, class, and other factors.  
c) These feedback effects may be part of a causal mechanism, which establishes how 
and why municipal governments respond to public health and safety crises 
differently. 
Table 18 
Sub-proposition findings for Flint and Manchester 
Sub Flint Manchester 
1a Strong Weak 
1b Strong Weak 
1c Strong Strong 
2a Strong Strong 
2b Weak Strong 
2c Weak Weak 
 
This comparison shows that Propositions 1c and 2a are demonstrated in full in Flint and 
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Manchester, while Proposition 2c is demonstrated with limitations and/or inconsistencies in both 
cities. All other sub-propositions are demonstrated with incongruent findings, suggesting that 
differences between the cities, the people within them, and the priorities of their local 
governments lead to meaningfully different results when it comes to public health and safety. 
This is not unexpected, but it does raise questions about why they differ, if it is in fact linked to 
elements of social construction, bureaucratic power and typologies, and policy feedback, and 
what this means for the future study and refinement of this framework. To that end, the following 
analysis of the proposed primary considerations for local government officials attempts to 
answer some of those questions.  
In Chapter II, four potential “primary considerations” of local government officials 
engaged in the policy process were laid out. These considerations are evidenced, to varying 
degrees, by the policy decision-makers in Flint and Manchester. Below, each is addressed in turn 
based on the findings of Propositions 1 and 2 in both cities.  
o The social construction of populations that receive the benefits and costs of the policy, is 
demonstrated through demographic data and the social construction typologies of 
Schneider et al. (2014). 
In both Flint and Manchester, there was evidence that the sociodemographic makeup and 
the associated social constructions of the population were part of the considerations made by 
policy decision-makers, as indicated in the findings of Propositions 1c, 2b, and 2c. While the 
benefits and costs have yet to be measured in any meaningful way as these crises are still 
ongoing, it is clear that there must be some consideration of social constructions in any future 
work that assesses what happened in either of these cities. Additionally, it will be important to 
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consider the proximity and visibility of these issues, and the impact this has on both social 
constructions and eventual policy outcomes in cities facing crises of public health and safety 
(Kreitzer & Watts Smith, 2018; Nicholson-Crotty & Nicholson‐Crotty, 2004; Schneider et al., 
2014; Soss & Schram, 2007). 
o The specific interests of those designing the policy and the power they have to promote 
those interests over others, is demonstrated in a content analysis of city council meetings 
and first-hand accounts of the policy-making process.  
Undoubtedly, the relative power of policymakers is evident from the meeting minutes 
analyzed in this project. Of course, certain members will always talk more often, propose more 
legislation, and engage more outside voices in the policy creation process (Oliver et al., 2012). 
However, as per the findings of Propositions 1a and 1b, this dynamic was stronger in Flint than 
in Manchester, where power and interests were more evenly spread among both Aldermen and 
outside interests. Interviewees saw similar dynamics, referring to particular individuals who they 
saw as powerful or astute at getting their issues and constituents onto the policy-making agenda.  
o The external influences on the policymakers, including those from within and outside 
government, is demonstrated by a similar analysis of public records of council meeting 
participants and first-hand accounts. 
External influences played a meaningful role in both cities, as shown in the findings of 
Propositions 2a and 2b. Citizen mobilization was seen by interviewees to be a meaningful factor 
in determining the course of action the city council or board would take. Almost all interviewees 
provided evidence through their statements that citizen mobilization occurred and had an impact 
on the bureaucratic politics occurring in the context of both local governments. In Flint, clean 
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water activists pushed the story of their city onto national news outlets, who in turn provided 
coverage and meaningful public accountability measures, while in Manchester, striking 
firefighters and personal stories from constituents showed Aldermen the cost of opioid addiction.  
o The specific individuals engaged in the policy formulation process, and their typologies 
and distinct strategies to accomplish objectives.  
As per the findings from Proposition 2a-c, there are associations between the typologies 
among local government officials and how they socially construct the populations they serve. In 
addition, the defining and refining of these typologies is useful in understanding the priorities 
individuals place on particular issues. For example, glad-handers and technicians were more 
likely to use the language of social construction compared to egoists or traditionalists. While the 
findings here are undoubtedly constrained by the low number of interviewees, further interviews 
and assessments can now build on these preliminary conclusions.  
The findings generated from this initial analysis of bureaucratic politics in these cities tell 
two stories. The story of Flint is the prioritizations of cost-saving concerns, race and class-based 
social constructions of the population, and the focus on engaging private interests to deal with 
the crisis at hand. It is a story of city officials attempting to navigate a takeover by state 
government, forcing them to shift their priorities and attitudes (Nickels, 2019). Racial, class, and 
other biases also play a meaningful role in Flint, as demonstrated through the interviews 
conducted with community leaders and bureaucrats and the overwhelming anecdotal and 
journalistic evidence gathered in that community (Eligon, 2016; Hanna-Attisha et al., 2016; 
Howell et al., 2019). 
Solutions to the crisis in Flint focused on mitigating damage and impact of the crisis, 
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including the distribution of bottled water, refunding water bills for residents, and engaging a 
new water supplier. However, none of these solutions addressed the underlying issue at hand: the 
pipes underneath the city leaching lead into any water that might pass through them. Some of 
these solutions were predicated upon engaging private entities or other governments, at a cost to 
the city. Others were dependent on grants, charity, or other semi-permanent funding structures. 
As evidenced in Chapter IV, the meaning of these type of solutions was clear to the stakeholders 
interviewed: The City of Flint did not prioritize engaging substantively with the root cause of the 
crisis. 
Conversely, the story of Manchester shows a Board reaching out to the Health 
Department, police and fire agencies, and local non-profits to ask: how can we help? While the 
Board may have focused on the concerns of particular agencies as they were brought before 
them, those interests were in turn correlated with ideas of civic duty, of “getting things done,” 
and of parochial solutions to address “wicked” problems. Police officials discussed arrest rates 
and drug courts; health officials talked about the connections between addiction and mental 
health, homelessness, and rehabilitation; fire officials and emergency medical professionals were 
concerned about overdoses, the use of Narcan, and their ability to provide enough staffing to 
meet demand (Weber & Khademian, 2008). 
Non-profits dedicated to rehabilitative, housing, and mental health services were engaged 
and funded by the Board to help mitigate the crisis. Aldermen used their informal networks 
within and outside of government to understand the problem and to engage other agencies, non-
profits, and citizen groups in the shared work of combatting opioid overdoses (Van Slyke, 2007). 
It is clear from the discussions that took place in front of the Board that these stakeholders are 
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working from a shared set of values and facts, a necessary element to making decisions in the 
public interest (Bozeman, 2007). While the process was far from perfect, there is evidence that 
the local government in Manchester engaged in meaningful ways with citizens and outside 
groups to deal with an important issue.  
Reassessing the Conceptual Model 
Based on the analysis of the two cases and the comparisons made in this chapter, there is 
a meaningful amount of validity to the conceptual model proposed in Chapter III (reproduced as 
Figure 24 below). The model accurately represents the factors present in both cases and does a 
suitable job of representing the major influences as determined by the literature. However, there 
are several ways in which this model can be improved to better represent these dynamics in 
future case studies and further research on this subject. In particular, I refer to the second 
proposition and the role of social construction and policy feedback in influencing decision-
making. 
 




As demonstrated in the Manchester case, the social construction of populations is often 
more nuanced in practice than the current literature suggests. Kreitzer and Watts Smith (2018) 
have begun to delve into this phenomenon, but more research is necessary to determine the ways 
in which social construction, particularly in conjunction with the visibility-proximity axis of 
policy feedback for mass publics developed by Soss and Schram (2007), influences how public 
officials make decisions about policy. Normatively “good” social constructions clearly can have 
an impact on policy decisions, and more work must be done to ensure that this concept is 
integrated into the model proposed here, as well as in other research on social construction and 
public policy.  
Further, the influence of policy feedback must be refined and measured in a more 
conclusive way than through an analysis of interviews with specific bureaucratic typologies. The 
limitations imposed by this method, including the number of interviewees, the typologies 
represented (or not), and the subjective interpretations of policy feedback and citizen 
mobilization by the interviewees was not sufficient to declare this element of the model valid. 
While the findings appear to track how the influence of policy feedback is represented in the 
conceptual model, more examples and further analysis are required. This analysis should include 
textual analysis of interviews as conducted here, but in conjunction with an investigation of 
specific votes and actions taken by those interviewees. This will allow the continued use of 
bureaucratic typologies and power to determine how and if received policy feedback is put into 
action by public officials, supplemented by a more objective observation as opposed to solely a 
more subjective perception. 
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As more case studies are conducted and other supplementary work is done to revisit and 
research this model, there will undoubtedly be further refinements and modifications to consider. 
This is both expected and essential, as the conceptual model is conceived as a representative 
framework which can be improved as relevant information is uncovered. That information may 
either demonstrate the validity or disprove how these factors and influences are represented. In 
either case, findings that impact how the model is constructed will help to develop a framework 
that may eventually be testable and comprehensive, representing a more fully nuanced 
understanding of how these factors and influences play out in the context of bureaucratic politics 
in local government. 
The findings presented in Chapters IV-VI, constrained as they are by the case study 
design, the dataset, and timeframe analyzed here, provide a useful starting point for future 
research. Additionally, these findings provide meaningful implications for the practice of public 
administration, particularly as pertaining to the implementation of policy, the relationships 
between street-level bureaucrats and local government officials, and the role of non-profits in 
local governance. Chapter VII explores those implications, discusses several potential pathways 





Chapter VII: Implications for Practice, Scholarship, and Further Investigation  
There are multiple takeaways from the findings presented in Chapters IV-VI that have 
implications for the practice of public administration, as well as for research in the areas of 
public administration, public policy, and political science. Beyond that, this project is designed 
to open a new field of inquiry into the utility of the revised framework designed here. This 
chapter summarizes those findings as they pertain to the practice of and research in public 
administration and related fields, proposes future avenues for that research, and indicates next 
steps to take to refine and improve the adapted framework laid out in Chapter III. Through each 
of these summations, the broader implications of this work are addressed and shown to be both 
useful and important to the field of public administration. Future research is proposed, taking 
into account the limitations and scope of the findings of this project, providing guidance as to the 
bounds of replicability and wider applicability of this study. 
Implications for Practice: Accountability, Street-Level Sensibilities, and Power 
Even in a theory-building exercise such as this one, practical applications may be 
uncovered, particularly through the process of interviewing stakeholders and administrators who 
are intimately involved in the policy decision-making process in their communities. By 
highlighting their experiences, advice, and knowledge, this work develops several key takeaways 
for practitioners. First, there is meaningful evidence to suggest that administrators who are 
tasked with assigning accountability and responsibility to liable parties must reassess how those 
determinations are made. Research shows that informal accountability can be institutionalized 
through effective collaboration and relationship-building, while it is challenged by competition 
for resources and funding, dynamics that are present in both cases presented here (Romzek, 
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LeRoux, Johnston, Kempf, & Piatak, 2014). Additionally, it is shown that among private actors 
conducting policy implementation, such as the private entities contracted to implement policy in 
Flint and Manchester, struggle with the dilemma of providing normatively “good” service while 
staying accountable to market incentives and client demands (Thomann, Hupe, & Sager, 2018).  
Recognizing the myriad challenges of developing intersectoral formal and informal 
accountability measures for street-level bureaucrats, it is clear that while administrators and 
bureaucrats often shoulder the blame during public health and safety crises, in the cases of Flint 
and Manchester political machinations determined the type of policy to be implemented long 
before street-level bureaucrats or managers were involved in the process. New strategies for 
assigning accountability, such as the calibrated public accountability model proposed by 
Schillemans (2016) may be more suited to understanding accountability in a crisis, as it takes 
into account decisions that occur prior to implementation, as well as noting the importance of the 
difference in accountability for processes and accountability for outcomes. 
Oversight bodies, inspector generals, auditors, and special committees convened for the 
purposes of investigating specific crises must ensure they are making the critical distinction 
between who implements a policy and who creates and upholds it. By understanding whose 
interests were served by a given policy, as the framework proposed herein has the ability to do, 
these investigatory commissions can start assigning accountability beyond implementation, 
appropriately recognizing the meaningful role that local policymakers have in the process of how 
a policy is implemented in practice. By expanding their capacity for assigning accountability, 
investigatory entities may be better served in their attempt to not only appropriately designate 
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responsible and accountable parties, but also to unearth the root causes of crises which may be 
evident based upon the interests promoted and the parties held responsible.  
Relatedly, it has been shown that street-level bureaucrats have some agency in the policy 
process, particularly when it comes to implementation, and that the social construction of 
populations may impact their decision-making and how they exercise their agency (Harrits, 
2018; Keiser, 2010; Lipsky, 1980; Maynard‐Moody & Musheno, 2012). By recognizing the 
value of and analyzing the specific perceptions and stories of these individuals, their street-level 
sensibilities become apparent. These views and perceptions, shaped by their experience on the 
ground during a crisis, as well as their own personal values and beliefs, are valuable both as 
evidence for the propositions laid out in this work and also as substantiation that these street-
level bureaucrats do, in fact, socially construct the identities of those they serve, even during 
times of acute crisis.  
It is to be expected that both practical and personal factors may impact how street-level 
bureaucrats make decisions, including perceptions of race and class of both the bureaucrat and 
the client (Watkins-Hayes, 2011). However, it then becomes imperative that manager-level local 
officials make an attempt to push back against the social construction of the populations their 
departments serve, particularly during times of crisis. If those populations are both socially 
constructed and treated differently based on those constructions, even a racially and 
socioeconomically representative bureaucracy may not be effective in combatting inequality in 
service provision. This is evidenced particularly in Flint, where a relatively racially 
representative city government made decisions and implemented policy that, according to 
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stakeholders, was not in the best interests of the public, at least in part based on their social 
constructions of the population.  
Finally, it has been well established across multiple academic disciplines that power 
among the myriad groups that influence local government decision-making, including non-
profits, activist groups, other governments, and private entities, is unequal (Dahl, 1961; Long, 
1949; Rainey & Bozeman, 2000; Wacquant, 2012). This work makes such inequality explicit and 
demonstrates how that power is wielded in the context of local government decision-making 
during crises. Outlining the power dynamics among actors is not only helpful in understanding 
how and why certain decisions are made, but also provides meaningful evidence of the “pressure 
points” in the system where certain interests are able to exert their power.  
By recognizing and exposing those points, including how personal, political, and business 
relationships are leveraged towards an invitation to appear in public before the city council (with 
the implicit merit that accompanies such an appearance) individuals and groups with less power 
can emulate the strategies of those with more power. While this is an imperfect and temporary 
solution to a systemic problem, it still holds that understanding “the game” as per Allison and 
Zelikow (1971) may make an interest group better at navigating the hierarchies within. Engaging 
with government in the same ways as more powerful actors may be one of the keys to accessing 
power for smaller and less influential organizations or individuals. Power, particularly that which 
influences local government, is exercised in ways not always visible to the public, and this work 
takes one more step towards exposing some of the ways in which the latent conflict of those 
exercising power and the interests of others is played out behind the scenes (Lukes, 1974).  
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Implications for Academe: Theory Development and Bridging the Gap 
The primary contribution to the field of public administration from this work is the 
establishment of core principles and basic building blocks of a revised theory of bureaucratic 
politics that applies specifically to local governments, and particularly to how they function 
during crises. The field of bureaucratic politics has explored numerous substantive areas of 
public management and administration, including performance management, public policy, 
foreign relations, regulation, and institutional power (Gains, John, & Stoker, 2008; Halperin & 
Clapp, 1974; Hammond, 1986; Rasmussen, 2000; Stone, Whelan, & Murin, 1986; Yang, 2009). 
However, the foundational theoretical framework has yet to be revised and updated to reflect the 
changes in society in the 21st century, nor has it been adjusted to reflect the realities of local 
government that vary in significant ways from the federal or state level.   
Developing a model of bureaucratic politics for local government helps to drive the 
academic conversation, creating a testable framework for scholars to use in studying the 
motivations of administrators in the municipal context. By incorporating elements of the 
literature on social construction, policy feedback, and bureaucratic power and typologies, this 
adapted framework brings the study of bureaucratic politics into the current era, recognizing the 
unique complications and vast racial and socioeconomic diversity of the American city (Downs, 
1967; Fox, 1974; Kreitzer & Watts Smith, 2018; Mettler & SoRelle, 2014; Moynihan & Soss, 
2014; Schneider & Ingram, 1993; Soss & Schram, 2007). These literatures, many of which were 
more fully developed in the post-Cold War era, reflect the modern American state and help to 
advance the theory of bureaucratic politics beyond an era defined by the ever-present threat of 
the Soviet Union and its allies. The utility of bureaucratic politics has been shown to extend 
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beyond the White House Situation Room, and this work builds on that scholarship to fully 
embrace the theory as one of governance and decision-making in multiple contexts (Brower & 
Abolafia, 1997; O'Leary, 2019; Stensöta, 2011). 
This reframed understanding of bureaucratic politics also takes into account broader 
concerns of how policy is created, and more importantly, by and for whom. In an increasingly 
diverse society with rising levels of racial and economic inequality, theorists of public 
administration, public policy, and political science have been sluggish to adapt existing 
frameworks to reflect these critical changes. Meaningful research questions are often asked using 
outdated frameworks and models that fail to take into account these important distinctions, 
drawing conclusions that are methodologically valid but theoretically weak. By updating this 
particular theoretical framework, both diversity and inequality are recognized and valued as 
important factors to consider in work on local government, and thereby incorporate a more 
holistic representation of the American city in the 2010s into our understanding of bureaucratic 
politics. Such an adjustment should be recognized as valuable to the academy at large as others 
do the same for theories of voting behavior, public service motivation, policy diffusion, and 
other important theoretical frameworks that cross interdisciplinary boundaries.  
This newly adapted theory is used here to look specifically at issues of crisis, and 
therefore is of particular value to scholars of emergency management looking to assess the 
effectiveness, fairness, and outcomes of specific planning, recovery, and mitigation processes. 
Scholars have begun the process of outlining how race and socioeconomic status may contribute 
to how emergency management is conducted in the United States, particularly with regard to 
Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath (Hicklin, O’Toole Jr, Meier, & Robinson, 2009; Roberts, 
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2006). Given that local governments are important actors in each step of the emergency 
management process, it will be important for that discipline to fully reckon with how inequality 
and race have impacted the response and recovery efforts to both natural and manmade disasters 
(Caruson & MacManus, 2011; Hartman & Squires, 2006). By using a framework that considers 
both how local governments respond to crisis and how the social construction of their 
populations may impact that response, scholars and practitioners will be able to develop new best 
practices for emergency management. 
Finally, as with any rigorous and empirical qualitative study, this work highlights 
innovative and important methodological approaches, and in doing so creates empirical 
qualitative work that drives the development of theory in the field of public administration, a task 
which is often called for but less frequently undertaken (Hacker & Pierson, 2014; Nabatchi, 
Goerdel, & Peffer, 2011; Rosenbloom, 1983). Such work helps to bridge the oft-lamented gap 
between theory and practice by developing new frames for looking at classic problems, as well 
as uncovering new avenues for research, including those presented forthwith. Theory 
development is an ongoing and long-term undertaking, and as such this study serves not only as 
a case study for understanding two particular instances of how bureaucratic politics impacts 
public health and safety, but also as a generator for any number of important questions 
concerning bureaucratic politics, emergency management, social constructions, and the 
intersections thereof.  
Avenues for Future Research: Cases, Causal Mechanisms, and the Neoliberal State 
This study consists of two cases, both of which were selected based on the availability of 
data, location, existing literature and research, and broad public knowledge of the crises studied. 
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As with any research design, this choice comes with inherent limitations. Most importantly, the 
number of cases must be increased to develop this theoretical framework further, and it must be 
done so in specific ways and with specific cases. Much of the future research outlined below is 
proposed to take the form of such cases, although there are diverse research designs that might 
serve scholars in these undertakings. While the qualitative case study analysis using mini-
ethnographies, a modified membership categorization analysis, and stories for research is a valid 
and useful methodology, there are other designs, including surveys, quantitative analyses, and 
mixed-method approaches that would also serve important roles in creating a more robust dataset 
from which to continue developing this framework. Such designs are reviewed in brief, as is 
potential further work on more general principles of bureaucratic politics. 
One case study is already underway using the same methodology and design as Flint and 
Manchester and will supplement these cases by further developing the adapted framework and 
revised theory of bureaucratic politics. This case, which considers the housing crisis in Oakland, 
California, reviews housing policy proposed and implemented by the Oakland City Council and 
the associated administrative managers in that city. In Oakland, rising housing costs have made 
the city the fourth most expensive rental market in the United States, while renters in the city 
have a median annual income of only $36,000 (Berg, 2016), forcing citizens into unsafe housing 
or onto the streets (Baldassari, 2017). This has resulted in a homelessness and affordable housing 
crisis, and the bureaucratic politics of the Oakland City Council and of other government 
officials in that city will be analyzed similarly to Flint and Manchester, providing a third case in 
the same style and with similar markers of utility and validity.  
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In selecting other future case studies, it may be necessary to undertake a case study that 
considers a positive outcome to a crisis, where media reports and the general public acknowledge 
that the end result is objectively “good” for the public health and safety of the individuals in that 
municipality. Flint, Manchester, and Oakland, while substantively different in both policies and 
outcomes, are seen more broadly as failures and instances where government, regardless of 
intentions, was unable to prevent or mitigate a crisis of public health and safety. For that reason, 
the cases within this study are limited to understanding failures, and positive cases may prove 
useful in moving beyond that narrative and exploring how local governments can succeed.  
One potentially positive case to consider is that of violent crime in Aurora, Illinois, a 
suburb of Chicago. Once cited as one of the more violent cities in Illinois, violent crime in 
Aurora has dropped drastically since its most recent peak in 2002 (Jones, 2018). This drop in 
violent crime was seen across the United States during that time period and Aurora is only one of 
many cities to be impacted, with New York City being perhaps the best-known example 
(Sharkey, 2018). However, given that New York is a large international financial and cultural 
capital, there has already been exhaustive and extensive research into the decline in crime in that 
city (Zimring, 2011). Conversely, Aurora is much similar to Flint or Manchester in terms of 
population and industry, and experienced a similarly significant decline in crime, but no 
empirical academic research to date has been conducted into how and why. Scholars have noted 
more broadly the impact of community policing programs, crime hot-spotting, and other similar 
policies on crime rates, and it is possible that similar dynamics were present in Aurora (Braga, 
Hureau, & Papachristos, 2011; Schnebly, 2008; Taylor, Koper, & Woods, 2011). A case study 
that considers the bureaucratic politics prior to the implementation of such programs, particularly 
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as it relates to the social construction of the populations who receive the benefits of the policies, 
may prove useful to understanding the decline in crime as a net positive, but with an eye towards 
answering the previously proposed question of policy “by and for whom”.  
Beyond solely positive cases, another example to be considered as a potentially relevant 
case is that of the homelessness crisis and the “Housing First” approach in Utah, and in particular 
in Salt Lake City, the largest municipality and capital of the state. Homelessness has been shown 
to be a critical issue of public health and safety, and Housing First is defined as a policy of 
providing shelter to homeless or rough-sleeping individuals without conditions (Bashir, 2002; 
Tsemberis, Gulcur, & Nakae, 2004). According to state officials, between 2003-2015 the 
Housing First approach resulted in a 91% decline in homeless individuals. It was widely 
remarked upon in many media and political circles that this policy, instituted and enacted by 
administrative and political leaders, led to an improvement in the public health and safety of the 
citizens of Utah. Articles that praised the policy response of the government officials involved 
appeared in the Washington Post, NPR, and The New Yorker (McCoy, 2015; McEvers, 2015; 
Surowiecki, 2014). However, there were also many who argued against this approach or 
suggested that the data provided by state officials was not accurate, and an audit of the policy in 
2018 provided some evidence that the methodology used to count homeless individuals was in 
part responsible for the steep decline (Dean, Behunin, Gibson, & Cabulagan, 2018; Overton, 
2007). An assessment of this case, one that is seen as overwhelmingly positive by the general 
public, but not by policy experts, and utilizing the same research design of the two cases 
analyzed here, may be a useful tool in understanding how policy feedback in particular is an 
important mechanism within this framework. 
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Case studies, while useful in understanding particular crises, must be supplemented by 
other research designs and methods if the conceptual model presented is to be demonstrated as 
valid and used to its full potential. There are several options for scholars to consider, three of 
which are proposed here. First, a survey of local government officials may prove useful to 
understand on a larger scale, how perceptions of policy feedback and social construction of 
populations influence how those individuals make decisions. Such a survey should target city 
council members, heads of administrative agencies, and city clerks along with other 
administrators involved in the policy process, and ask questions about how groups and 
individuals are chosen to appear before city council, whether those appearances are important to 
the survey taker’s future decision-making, and the importance they place on particular values 
when making policy decisions. A large-n survey along these lines would provide valuable insight 
into whether the conceptual model posited here is valid, and to what extent it accurately 
represents the considerations of local government officials. 
Second, quantitative analyses that focus on budgetary priorities in conjunction with 
public health and safety outcomes of a particular crisis may help determine how the prioritization 
of cost-saving policy may be detrimental to public health and safety. By utilizing existing data on 
the allocation of budgetary resources and public data available through institutions such as the 
Centers for Disease Control, the Department of Justice, and state governments, it should be 
possible to determine, compared to similar cities with similar problems, how budgeting impacts 
the public health outcomes of a particular crisis such as opioid addiction or water quality. Just as 
a survey would provide important context to micro-level decision-making by individuals, a study 
along these lines would provide macro-level context to broader implications around the 
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allocation of resources and the prioritization of certain interests over others by local 
governments. This type of multi-city quantitative study will help refine the conceptual model 
further, demonstrating how particular elements either accurately represent how local 
governments operate, or are overly deterministic. 
Finally, the incorporation of mixed methodologies and technological advances into this 
field of research will undoubtedly prove fruitful. New technologies, such as geographic 
information systems (GIS) and social media, can help to spatially map crises, and with the 
support of qualitative observation of the individuals impacted and quantitative assessment of the 
outcome of the crisis, the impact of policy around public health and safety may be rendered in a 
holistic and comprehensive manner. In doing so, the conceptual model here may be refined 
further to include physical and spatial characteristics of crises, location-based information, and 
micro-level data on individual reactions to public health and safety crises, similar to the 
scholarship being conducted in the fields of emergency management and disaster planning 
(Middleton, Middleton, & Modafferi, 2014; Veil, Buehner, & Palenchar, 2011). As these 
technologies and methods become more advanced, the nature of the data that can be collected 
about how bureaucrats make decisions may prove more useful than anticipated.  
Virtually every American city has experienced some type of public health and safety 
crisis in its history, and as is to be expected by the nature of such crises, many of those have 
resulted in negative outcomes for the populations of those cities. It is difficult to define 
overarching causal mechanisms for these crises, and while the conclusions presented in Chapter 
VI indicate that local government officials in both cases in this study did see cost-saving factors 
as causal, there is more work to be done before such assertions can be deemed valid. However, 
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the evidence to this point suggests that there is a causal mechanism related to cost-saving 
concerns that is driving the failures of local governments to prioritize public health and safety, 
and that future research should proceed from that postulation. 
There is validity to the criticism that developing a model likely to find corroboration of 
these outcomes is subject to some level of confirmation bias. However, it would be just as 
limiting to only consider the relatively infrequent successes of local government in prioritizing 
public health and safety. The minimal work that does exist on how local governments deal with 
crisis, particularly as pertaining to how citizens and mass publics perceive their conduct, is rife 
with inconsistencies, including widespread variation between how officials understand the 
results of their efforts as compared to citizens (Avery, Graham, & Park, 2016; Lee, 2009). While 
it is important to acknowledge the potential for confirmation bias with regard to the assumption 
of failure, the evidence suggests that the perception as well as the reality of frequent failure is 
due to the fact that local governments are subject to pressures and concerns, including special 
interests and managerial priorities, that may limit their ability to respond to crisis (Agranoff & 
McGuire, 2004; Sharp, 2012). 
There are other theoretical alternatives to understanding these crises, including through 
urban regime theory, which posits that policy elites with access to resources are the sole group 
that can engage in “sustained politics,” including confronting crises. However, criticism of that 
work has shown that in fact other groups, including marginal entities that are seen as low-power, 
low-deserving by elites as per the social construction framework, do have some meaningful 
power to influence politics as pertaining to housing, labor rights, and education (Jones-Correa & 
Wong, 2015; Stone, 1989). Given this evidence and that of the preceding cases, it would appear 
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that urban regime theory, at least as originally conceived and proposed, may have little 
explanatory power when it comes to understanding how crises are resolved. With continued 
work, a revised framework of bureaucratic politics may be able to fill that gap, providing an 
empirical and relevant way to understand how policy is created and implemented to deal with 
large-scale crises of public health and safety.  
Given the relevance of economic concerns and priorities as related to potential causal 
mechanisms in the two cases presented here, future research must also consider how the broader 
neoliberal state and its attendant influence on local government impacts how crises are managed 
and resolved (Centeno & Cohen, 2012; Harvey, 2007; Howell, Doan, & Harbin, 2019). 
Neoliberalism, operationalized by the institutional frameworks of modern society that promote 
global trade policy, property rights, and deference to market forces, is present in Flint, 
Manchester, Oakland, and in cities across the United States and the world. These macro-level 
forces, while not explicated in the framework developed in this project, are embedded in our 
understandings of both how and why crises of public health and safety develop, as well as what 
remedies to these crises are possible within the American city (Gane, 2012; Soss, Fording, & 
Schram, 2011).  
The carceral state, which exists for many American citizens at the intersection of race and 
class under neoliberalism, is not only enforced through police departments and welfare offices. 
In many ways, it is this neoliberal carceral state that limits the prospects for success of local 
governments dealing with crises (Beckett & Murakawa, 2012; Bernstein, 2012; Soss et al., 2011; 
Weaver & Lerman, 2010). In Flint, this dynamic can be evidenced through the punitive measures 
inflicted upon street-level bureaucrats charged with involuntary manslaughter while the 
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Governor of Michigan remains unindicted (Williams, 2019). In Manchester, it is evidenced by 
the overwhelming focus on law enforcement and prosecution as primary avenues towards 
mitigating the opioid crisis. In Oakland, the conditions of the homeless have been remarked upon 
by the United Nations, whose Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing stated explicitly in a 
press conference that the homeless population of that city are “the victims of failed policies—not 
the perpetrators of crime” (BondGraham, 2018; Farha, 2018). Given these cases, an assessment 
of crisis and emergency management in the United States through the lens of neoliberalism is 
clearly warranted, and a revised framework of bureaucratic politics will be a useful tool in 
conducting that analysis.  
Governments will always be forced to deal with crises. They will make decisions about, 
prioritize, and enact policies that cope with those crises and they will be obligated to defend 
those decisions to their constituents and to the broader public. This process may not be 
homogeneous across the United States or the world, but the commonalities in decision-making 
that occur during a crisis, as first proposed by Allison (1969), have proven to be relevant and 
important for understanding those dynamics in general. This study, and the work that arises from 
it, is the next step in applying those principles to specific instances of crisis, in the hopes of 
developing new pathways for knowledge and applied research that can not only change how 
crisis is studied, but also how governments choose to prioritize the public health and safety of the 
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Appendix A: Codebook 
Code Proposition Code Group Comment 
drug n/a Manchester 
Code covers full meeting; reference to opioid(s), 
opiates, heroin, fentanyl, drug(s). Spurious references 
that refer to other drugs are removed. 
water n/a Flint 
Code covers full meeting; reference to water, lead, 
pipe(s). Spurious references that refer to water in 
another context are removed. 
managerial_focus_int PROP1 Interests 
Focus on managerial interests; efficiency, 
effectiveness, human capital management, agency 
performance or other. 
temporary_int PROP1 Interests 
Focus on temporary interests: stop-gap measures, 
time-limited policy, impermanent efforts, or other.  
electoral_int PROP1 Interests 
Focus on electoral interests; reference to votes, 
concerns about political future, calling of press 
conferences, ceremonial activities, or other. 
personal_int PROP1 Interests 
Focus on personal interests; discussion of personal 
relationships, photo or media advisory, connection to 
personal story, or other. 
area rewards_int PROP1 Interests 
Focus on area rewards; policy that serves particular 
neighborhoods, request to pay legal damages for 
certain individuals or groups, listening session/town 
hall for particular area, or other. 
problem_solving_int PROP1 Interests 
Focus on problem solving; reference to specific 
program to address specific problem, information for 
citizens to solve issue, resolution or instruction to do 
specific action, or other. 
civic_duty_int PROP1 Interests 
Focus on civic duty; interest of larger public 
considered, policy serves entire municipality, 
information session intended for all, or other. 
agency_int PROP1 Interests 
Focus on agency interests; agency-specific funding, 
resolution that benefits specific agency, issues that are 
dealt with by particular agency, or other. 
citizen_rel PROP1 Relationships Interaction between citizen and council member. 
political_rel PROP1 Relationships 
Interaction between elected official and council 
member. 
government_rel PROP1 Relationships 
Interaction between government official (non-elected) 
and council member. 
private_rel PROP1 Relationships 
Interaction between representative of a private entity 
and council member.  
mission_org PROP1 Organizational 
Organizational mission; reference to mission or 
purpose, clear adherence to organizational mission of 
agency, or other. 
roles_org PROP1 Organizational 
Organizational roles; reference to the role of a 
member within an organization, special order by 
individual based upon their role/status, or other. 
networks_org PROP1 Organizational 
Organizational networks; indication of the use of an 
organizational network (internal or external), 





structure_org PROP1 Organizational 
Organizational structure; scheduling of meetings, 
reference to the hierarchy or structure of organization, 
or other. 
professional_org PROP1 Organizational 
Professionalism; adherence to rules of organization, 
action taken due to or reference to the professionality 
of organization, or other. 
norms_org PROP1 Organizational 
Organizational norms; clear following of 
organizational norms or informal rules, actions taken 
based upon the norms of an agency, or other. 
org_home_env PROP1 Environmental 
Organization of actor; reference to an individual’s 
home agency, action taken in support of home agency, 
or other. 
info_asym_env PROP1 Environmental 
Information asymmetry between actors; evidence of 
one side of interaction having more information, use 
of information as tool to negotiate, or other. 
account_env PROP1 Environmental 
Reference to accountability in context of crisis, 
specific action to assign accountability, or other. 
power_env PROP1 Environmental 
Evidence of unequal power among actors, action 
taken to exert power over other actor, reference to 
hierarchy, or other. 
local_env PROP1 Environmental 
Issue specific to local environment; MI environmental 
law or NH drug law, municipal ordinance, or other. 
resources_env PROP1 Environmental 
Reference or discussion of financial or other 
resources; budget decisions, agency funding, 




Cost-savings concerns, causal; reference to cost-





Cost-savings concerns, prioritized; reference to cost-
savings being prioritized over other issues, decisions, 
policies, or other. 
follower PROP2 Typologies See Fig. 3 
egoist PROP2 Typologies See Fig. 3 
traditionalist PROP2 Typologies See Fig. 3 
glad-hander PROP2 Typologies See Fig. 3 














Social construction of a particular group based on 








Feedback Reference to citizen mobilization around a policy. 
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